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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the continuation of PRC-North Korean alliance even though 
significant changes have emerged in international security environment. Numerous 
studies have focused on the decreased strategic value of North Korea with respect to 
Chinese national interests, but Pyongyang still serves as stepping stone for China to 
expand its leverage. China’s national objectives of maintaining its leverage in Northeast 
Asia indicates that Beijing will maintain the 1961 alliance to assure its security interests.  
By examining the formation of PRC-DPRK alliance, this thesis assesses the 
characteristics of their alliance and analyzes the evolution in Beijing’s approach to 
Pyongyang by explaining how transitions in the security environment have affected their 
alliance. This thesis concludes that, for China, the rationale for maintaining the PRC-
DPRK alliance is to guarantee China’s national interests, not to sustain its traditional 
“sealed in blood” relationship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
In July 1961, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance.”  The treaty established a security alliance, often described by both 
capitals as a relationship as close as “lips and teeth,” that committed each side to mutual 
defense in case of attack. From then on, the Chinese-North Korean alliance became an 
important axis in the dynamic of Northeast Asian security relations.  
However, considering the PRC’s entry into the international order as an accepted 
sovereign state in the early 1970s and its domestic development policies of “reform and 
opening” under Deng Xiaoping, China’s approach to the Korean peninsula has evolved. 
In particular, with the end the end of the Cold War and China’s establishment of 
diplomatic relations with and its rapidly growing economic ties with the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), it seems appropriate to re-examine Beijing’s commitment to the 1961 
alliance with Pyongyang.  Several strains have caused cracks in their relationship, and in 
significant respects PRC support of the DPRK, which is a country that threatens the 
stability of the Northeast Asian region, has become a huge burden on Beijing.  
Nevertheless, Beijing and Pyongyang have not renounced their alliance.  This fact 
raises several questions. What is the reason for their continued alliance? How does the 
1961 alliance figure into Beijing’s continuing support for the DPRK politically, 
economically and militarily? The purpose of this thesis is to assess the PRC’s view of the 
alliance in lieu of the dramatic changes in the respective international environment and 
domestic evolution in each country. 
Numerous studies have attempted to analyze the relevant factors that sustain the 
alliance between the PRC and DPRK. However, despite the significance of the topic, 
research has been impeded by the limitations on and difficulties in gaining to relevant 
materials. Existing studies only focused on historical description and offer only 
fragmentary analysis and evaluation.  
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In addition, the alliance theory, which argues that alliances will be altered or 
dropped altogether when a nation’s relationship and environment change, cannot 
adequately explain the realities of the PRC-DPRK alliance. This thesis hypothesizes that 
the PRC-DPRK alliance is based not solely on the traditional relationship of two 
countries, but also more centrally on the PRC’s national security objectives and ambition 
to expand its external influence. In particular, this thesis will focus on the PRC’s foreign 
policy, with the variable of shift in the PRC’s domestic priorities and the transition in the 
PRC’s international security environment.1  
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the PRC, led by Deng Xiaoping, 
launched a series of major reforms.  In addition, Beijing sought to improve relationships 
with neighboring countries. As a result, Beijing signed a peace treaty with Tokyo in 1978 
despite the historical dispute between the two countries, normalized diplomatic relations 
with Washington in 1979, restored friendly relations with the Soviet Union in 1989, and 
officially recognized Seoul in 1992. These steps made Pyongyang uncomfortable, but, 
they did not mean the end of the relationship between the two countries. They did 
underscore, however, that the relationship between the two countries is vulnerable to 
changing national interest needs, especially with regard to the PRC.  
In some significant sense, the PRC alliance with the DPRK continues to serve 
Chinese domestic and external interests and helps it to achieve its objectives. By 
maintaining its alliance with the DPRK, the PRC can enhance its influence in the 
Northeast Asian region and use the alliance to moderate the DPRK’s provocations that 
threaten the security of Northeast Asian region. Beijing thereby can improve the stability 
of security conditions on its border, which it needs for its continuing economic 
development.  
Therefore, the main hypothesis examined in this thesis is that the PRC-DPRK 
alliance continues to be valid on the grounds that it continues to be useful to the PRC and 
serves its fundamental interests.  
                                                 
1 Shen Dingli, “North Korea’s Strategic significance to China,” China Security, (Autumn 2006): 26–
27. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
Assessment of the continuing validity of the PRC-DPRK alliance is important for 
the following reasons. First of all, in the Northeast Asian region, the PRC-DPRK alliance 
has significant influence on regional stability, largely because the PRC is one of the few 
countries that can directly communicate with Pyongyang.2 Second, in Seoul’s view, the 
validity of the alliance between the PRC and DPRK plays a role in ROK’s unification 
strategy, as well as its policy toward the DPRK. In that regard, Seoul must take into 
account not only the interests of the United States but also those of the PRC.  In that 
assessment, the strength of Beijing’s commitments to Pyongyang must also be weighed. 
For example, with respect to the process of investigating the recent sinking of the ROK’s 
naval vessel Cheonan, the high-level PRC-DPRK summit in Beijing in early May 
negatively affected any attempt to enlist the PRC’s cooperation. 3  Therefore, 
understanding the interests that lead the PRC to maintain its alliance with the DPRK may 
help the ROK, as well as other countries engaged on the Korean peninsula, to take 
appropriate measures to address their interests. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Two bodies of literature are introduced in this section. Research on diverse 
existing studies about the PRC-DPRK Alliance provides recent approach toward the 1961 
alliance treaty based on changes in international politics. Research on theories of 
alliances supplies potential explanations for the China’s necessity of maintaining alliance 
with North Korea in terms of national interests. 
1. Existing Studies About the PRC-DPRK Alliance 
Recent studies assessing the 1961 alliance focus on the structural and 
motivational changes in the Sino-DPRK relationship in the context of the North Korea 
                                                 
2 Christopher P. Twomey, “China Policy toward North Korea and its implications for the United 
States: Balancing Competing Concerns,” Strategic Insights 5, no. 7 (September 2006), 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2006/Sep/twomeySep06.pdf, 
(accessed October 1, 2010). 
3 Yusik Choi, “International Perspective toward Result of ‘Cheonan’ Investigation,” Chosun Ilbo, May 
24, 2010, http://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/23/2010052301099.html, (accessed 
September 12, 2010). 
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nuclear crises of the early 1990s and since 2002.  Most scholars argue that the PRC-
DPRK alliance has evolved from the “sealed in blood” relationship of the 1960s into a 
looser alliance.4 Andrew Scobell argued that the PRC-DPRK alliance is only a virtual 
alliance because the relationship between two countries had been weakened by China’s 
policy shifts, such as opening its economy and the establishment of its relationship with 
the ROK.5  In addition, the relationship between the PRC and DPRK was strained further 
after North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006. Not only that, some scholars have speculated  
that Beijing may ignore its commitments to Pyongyang by entering a “grand bargain” 
with Washington in the matter of North Korea and so break the Sino-DPRK alliance.6 
Other research concludes that the PRC puts a higher emphasis on the relationship 
with South Korea than with North Korea. Such studies have a tendency to simplify 
China’s policy, focusing on a principle of separating of economy and politics. Therefore, 
such analysis overlooks the complex, intertwined national interest that derives from 
relationships with surrounding countries while concentrating on economic interest. As a 
result, they oversimplify the PRC-DPRK relationship.7  
However, these studies are not persuasive in explaining the continuing PRC-
DPRK alliance. For example, considering that since 1994 China has annually provided 
large amounts of fuel and food aid, which served as a lifeline to North Korea, the 
                                                 
4 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length 
(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: the Limits of 
Influence,” Current History 102, no. 665 (September 2003): Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, “The Korea 
Crisis,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2003); Jian Yang, “China and North Korea: Old Friend, New 
Challenges,” NZ International Review (May / June 2003); Chen Jian, “limits of the ‘lips and Teeth’ 
alliance: An historical Review of Chinese-North Korean Relations,” Asia Program Special Report, no. 115, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (September 2003); Samuel S. Kim, “China and North 
Korea in a changing World,” Asia Program Special Report, no 115, Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars (September 2003). 
5 Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: The Limits of Influence,” Current History 102, no. 665 
(September 2003): 277. 
6 An Inhae, “Present state and prospective of China’s policy toward North Korea,” the Annual 
Academic Conference, Korea International Politics Institute (December, 2006): 53-55. “Big Deal” means 
cooperation scenario between China and the U.S regarding matter of Taiwan and North Korea. 
7 Li Dan, “Changes of DPRK-China Relationship and its Durability” (PhD. diss., Chonnam University, 
2003), 5–6. 
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relationship is not a routine one.8 At the same time, even though China agreed to the 
sanctions against the DPRK by UN Security Council imposed on North Korea after its 
nuclear testing in 2006, it also tried to ease the impact on North Korea that arose from 
international regulation by opposing military restrictions on the DPRK.  
Therefore, the PRC-DPRK alliance is something more than a routine relationship. 
From a broad prospective, their relationship appears to have strengthened since the 1990s 
because China are still interested in using North Korea as a politically and militarily 
strategic area for its national security interests in Asia. 
2. Existing IR Theories of Alliance 
a. Power-Based Theory 
When it comes to alliance, realists agree that alliance formation is shaped 
by power competence between the great powers. Due to characteristics of international 
politics as anarchy, every state works harder to increase its own strength, or it combines 
with others, if it is falling behind. 9  States in the international system also aim to 
guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats and because there 
is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they are put in the danger, each state 
tends to maintain the balance of power for its survival. 10  Balance means tangible 
equilibrium of military capability among the dominated countries that deters one country 
from establishing dominance. According to Kenneth Waltz, who wrote a Theory of 
International Politics, “balancing” means states join alliances to protect themselves from 
states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat. States will choose to 
balance for two main reasons. First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a 
potential hegemony before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means 
placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence.11 Second, joining the more vulnerable 
                                                 
8 David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the long term,” The Washington 
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 46. 
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126. 
10 John J. Mearsheimer, the Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 32–33. 
11 Keith L. Shimko, International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies (Boston: Wardsworth, 
2010), 71. 
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side increases the new member’s influence, because the weaker side has greater need for 
assistance. Joining the stronger side, by contrast, reduces the new member’s influence 
and leaves it vulnerable to the whims of its new partners. Alignment with the weaker side 
is thus the preferred choice.12 Bandwagoning is aligning with the threatening state or 
coalition. By doing so, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by 
diverting it elsewhere. 13  Waltz argues that balancing is more common than 
bandwagoning, when states are more secure, because aggressors will face combined 
opposition.14 Therefore, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that 
strong states will remain benevolent.15  
Other significant assertions regarding balance of power in alliance 
formation are found in Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and 
Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. In these books, 
the authors argue that alliances are often formed based on the “function of preserving the 
status quo” 16  and balance of power logic often causes great powers to form alliances and 
cooperate against common enemies. 17  
According to balance of power logic, states attempt to transform their 
alliance depending on national interests. Thus, a typical alliance is imbedded in a 
dynamic field of diverse interests and purposes. Namely, the value and the chances of an 
alliance must be considered in the context of the overall policies within which it is 
expected to operate. General alliances are typically of temporary duration and most 
prevalent. For this reason, when power is unbalanced, such circumstance stimulates states 
to maintain and form alliances to balance. That is, as Barry Hughes explains, when  
 
                                                 
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (July, 1985): 5–6. 
13  Ibid., 8. 
14  Stephan M. Walt, the Origin of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 17. 
15  Waltz, “Alliance Formation,” 15. 
16  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 
1972), 43. 
17  John J. Mearsheimer, the Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 52–53. 
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opposition power weakens, old disagreements among alliance partner will resurface, 
causing either dissension in the alliance or coalition breakdown as in case of United 
States and USSR after WW II.18  
However, the fact that PRC-DPRK alliance continues to be evaluated as a 
firm alliance—even though no other power threatens both allies and there is no common 
foe opposing them—shows the limitations of balance of power theory. In actuality, the 
PRC-DPRK alliance was created not only by the need to defend the DPRK, but also by 
the need to defend the PRC in a “lips and teeth” relationship 
b. Threat-Based Theory 
There is another argument related to alliance formation. Walt said that “although 
power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only part. It is more accurate to 
say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest 
threat.”19 Namely, the immediate threat that offensive capabilities pose may create a 
strong incentive for others to balance. In this theory, balancing and bandwagoning are 
more accurately viewed as a response to threats. It is important to consider other factors 
that will affect the level of threat that states may pose.20  
Waltz argues that the alliance choices are decided by a degree of potential threat, 
which is evaluated by the opposition’s “aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capability, and the perceived intentions.” Waltz redefines balancing as “allying 
in opposition to the principal source of danger,” and bandwagoning as “allying with the 
state that poses the major threat,” 21 In such threat-based alliance theory, when states 
recognize more threat from other states, they are willing to ally with the strongest state. 
In other words, alliances form when states perceive threats from their enemies.  
                                                 
18 Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1997), 127. 
19 Stephen M. Walt, the Origin of Alliance (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21. 
20 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance: Balancing and Bandwagoning,” in International Politics: Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, eds., Robert J Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson/Longman, 
2002), 98. 
21 Waltz, “Alliance Formation,” 4. 
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However, this theory does not explain why the PRC and DPRK maintain their 
alliance. This is because Beijing’s motive for the existing alliance between these two 
countries is not threats from the U.S-ROK alliance, but the desire to make a stable 
security environment for the PRC. 
c. Self-Interest-Based Theory 
Realists posit that states are the key actors in world politics. They further 
argue that states pursue key interests; realists claim that those interests provide the only 
legitimate basis for state action. Balance of power and balance of threat theories are 
criticized due to these theories failing to provide appropriate explanation for a nation’s 
self-interests.22 
George Liska proposes that alliances aim at maximizing gains and sharing 
liabilities and all association depends on the existence of identical interests. Therefore, in 
terms of internal and international security interests, states are directly acting based on 
their self-interests when they form alliances.23 In addition, states choose allying in order 
to accomplish specific security goals more easily. In other words, the aim of balancing is 
self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of 
bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, “balancing 
is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain,” as 
Schweller remarks.24  
The distribution of benefits is likely to reflect the distribution of power 
within an alliance, as does the determination of policies. A great power has a good 
chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies. A weak nation 
may be able to exploit its relations with a strong ally by committing the latter to the 
support of its vital interests, which may mean nothing to the strong ally or may even run 
counter to its interests. The relationship between the United States and ROK exemplifies 
                                                 
22 Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change, 76–78. 
23 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: the Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962), 29–30. 
24 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,” 
International Security 19 (Summer 1994): 74. 
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this situation.25 Namely, some states are willing to give up their sovereignty to preserve 
security by allying with a strong state, while other states are willing to give up security to 
preserve sovereignty by allying with weak state.26 
Michael Barnett and Jack Levy also find that realism is “relatively silent 
concerning Third World alliances in general or how state-society relations in particular 
might give rise to distinctive patterns of alignment behavior.” They stress the resource-
providing function of alliances and the impact on the domestic political economy. They 
conclude that Third World leaders form alliances “to secure urgently needed economic 
and military resources to promote domestic goals.” 27 
Snyder also argues that states form or join alliances if the benefits of doing 
so are greater than the costs. The benefits are counted chiefly in terms of the increased 
security resulting from the partner’s commitment, and the costs largely in terms of the 
autonomy sacrificed in the commitment to the partner. Snyder suggests security benefits 
of alliance, including deterrence of attack, capability for defense against attack, 
deterrence of attack on the ally, preclusion of alliance or alignment between the partner 
and the opponent, and increased control or influence over the allied state. 28 He notes the 
risk of having to come to the aid of the ally, the risk of entrapment in war by the ally, the 
risk of a counter-alliance, and foreclosure of alternative alliance options, and general 
constraints on freedom of action, as the principal costs of alliance.29 In interest-based 
theories, alliance is decided by how allies increase their interests more than the costs they 
pay. Therefore, allies make an effort to keep the alliance valid by increasing their self-
interests in the context of alliance.  
                                                 
25 Arnold Wolfers, Alliance policy in the cold war (Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 
190. 
26  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting through the Wealth of Notions,” 
International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 61. 
27  Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of 
Egypt,” International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 369–379. 
28  Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 43–44. 
29  Ibid., 44. 
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This thesis assesses the utility of these international relations theories in 
explaining the continuing value of the PRC-DPRK security alliance for Beijing  
D. METHODOLOGY  
This research attempts to discover the reasons why the PRC-DPRK alliance is still 
valid from the perspective of the PRC, despite transitions in international political 
environment. As previously mentioned, the main hypothesis to be examined in the thesis 
is that the PRC and DPRK alliance is valid because the PRC’s national interests can be 
achieved efficiently through continued alliance with the DPRK.  
To test this hypothesis, the thesis sets up the transitions in international political 
environment and Beijing’s political, economic policies as independent variables, and the 
validity of the alliance as dependent variable. This is because these factors play a 
significant role in causing conflict and cooperation between two countries. For example, 
the end of Cold War and establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul becomes a new 
start in the Sino-DPRK relations. Not only that, it also means a change and adjustment of 
Sino-DPRK relations. To investigate what changes were caused and how these changes 
affected the PRC’s foreign policy, it is important to understand the validity of the 
alliance. Therefore, this thesis will suggest important effects in order to find the reason 
why the PRC maintains the alliance with the DPRK.  
In addition, after the end of Cold War, the PRC became the only country that 
supports the DPRK. While the PRC saw a reduced need for an alliance with the DPRK, 
the DPRK’s need for alliance intensified. Therefore, this thesis puts a higher emphasis on 
the PRC’s policies on foreign relations as core independent variables than those of the 
DPRK.  
Also, the PRC has improved relations with surrounding countries to create the 
stable security environment needed for pursuit of economic growth, even though it 
negatively affected relations with the DPRK. On the other hand, Beijing wants to 
maintain “status quo” in the Northeast Asian region in order to achieve its security aims. 
Exploring transitions in international security environment and the PRC’s foreign policies  
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will help shed light on why the PRC-DPRK alliance is still valid. Because such 
transitions have caused diverse changes in two countries relations, however, they also 
create need for continued DPRK alliance for the PRC.  
For these reasons, the PRC-DPRK alliance in this thesis is measured in two 
dimensions: (1) the level of international environment; and (2) the implications for the 
PRC’s political and economic policies. This study considers an agreement from a high-
level summit between two countries in order to find out the alliance’s changing mutual 
perception. Also, the thesis analyzes statistical data from China and Korea, such as 
periodic reports of national newspapers’ about the alliance, governmental statements and 
Chinese and foreign analysts’ comments, which can serve as useful tools to explain 
cooperation and conflict between two countries. This thesis also explores some previous 
studies about the PRC-DPRK alliance, since some of them are useful in distinguishing 
distinct characteristics of the PRC-DPRK alliance. 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter has briefly explained 
the research questions and methodology and overviewed existing studies evaluating the 
PRC-DPRK alliance. The second chapter examines the establishment of the Sino-DPRK 
alliance in order to evaluate its meaning from a historical fellowship to geopolitical 
importance in international environment, and then call attention to its characteristics.  
The third chapter examines changes in the alliance between the two countries by 
focusing on transitions in international political environment, such as the end of Cold 
War and the PRC’s “reform and opening” policy. The fourth chapter shows how despite 
such transitions, the value of alliance has strengthened from Beijing’s standpoint. Finally, 
the last chapter concludes by verifying the overall causal relationship between the 
variables and summarizing the implications of the research. 
 
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 13
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRC-
DPRK ALLIANCE 
In this chapter, I call attention to distinct characteristics of the PRC-DPRK 
alliance and take a more detailed approach to the establishment of factors of alliance. The 
logic of this relationship is tied to more than a half century of history China shares with 
the DPRK of military cooperation, socialist ideology, and anti-American views.30 In the 
process of alliance formation, Chinese domestic politics and a specific international 
environment, the Cold War, served as dominant variables. In the Cold War era, Beijing 
and Pyongyang cooperated for reciprocal interests rather than confrontation because they 
shared a similar political system and considerable strategic interests in regional 
international relations. By analyzing the process that developed from an informal secret 
relationship to a formal alliance, this chapter identifies distinct characteristics of their 
relationship  
A. THE PROCESS OF THE ALLIANCE FORMATION 
1. Historical Background of PRC-DPRK Relationship 
The relationship between China and North Korea started from a pre-modern 
relationship in the seventh century BC.31 China, as the cultural and political leading 
power of East Asia, considered other countries as dependent states. According to the 
Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China, China considered the Korean 
peninsula a gate and a shield connecting with foreign powers. 32  Therefore, Beijing said 
that China and Korea were as close as “lips and teeth,” emphasizing the importance of 
national security.33 This factor shows that China has looked upon the Korean peninsula 
                                                 
30 Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: The Close but Uncomfortable Relationship,” Current 
History 101 (September 2002): 278. 
31 “Korea-China relations,” Northeast Asian History Foundation, 
http://english.historyfoundation.or.kr/?sub_num=20, (accessed September 30, 2010).   
32 News Coverage Guideline of Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China. 
33 The China-North Korea relationship has often been likened to that of the “Teeth and Lips”, 
following a Chinese idiom that says that when the lips are gone, the teeth feel frigid, Scott Zhou, “All teeth 
and lips for now,” Asian Times Online, October 26, 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ21Ad01.html, (accessed September 30, 2010). 
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as an important strategic region as well as from indicator of external threat perceptions. 
After Japan took complete control of Korea in 1985, China was exposed to direct external 
threats, and Beijing realized the importance of cooperation with Korean independence 
movements. During the anti-Japanese war period, close military, political, economic, and 
cultural relations were established between the Chinese and Korean comrades.34 The 
combined anti-Japanese armed struggles in 1900s are examples of collaboration.35  Some 
Korean anti-Japanese forces- such as the Northeast Anti-Japanese Combined Force and 
the Chosun Volunteer Forces for Independence 36 —established a united front with 
Chinese. They shared the common objective of confronting Japanese imperialism and so 
interacted in order to fight against Japanese army. Not only that, most Korean 
communists supported the Chinese Communist Party from the beginning of Chinese civil 
war to 1949.37  
Table 1.   Military Cooperation Between Chinese and North Korean Revolutionaries 
From 1938 to 194938 












Military Strength Three battalion Unknown 6,000 Roughly 40,000 
 
Therefore, China and North Korea established a special relationship, which was 
based on political and ideological sense of kinship in the period of anti-Japanese 
movement. Old generations of revolutionaries developed a communist brotherhood in  
                                                 
34 James Person, Limits of the “lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 
1955–1984 (Washington: Woodro Wilson International center for Scholars, 2009), 3. 
35 Sangsoon Kim, History of North Korea (Seoul:JimoonKak, 1961), 61-65: Sangkeun Lee, Changes 
in Chinese view toward the Unification of the Korean Peninsula, (PhD. Diss., Dankook University, 1995), 
108–109. 
36 Sangsook Lee, “A study on the Change of North Korea-China’s Alliance,” (Master’s thesis, 
Dongguk University, 2001), 18. 
37 Dan Lee, “Changes of DPRK-China Relationship and Its Durability,” (Master’s thesis, Chonnam 
National University, 2003), 27–28. 
38 Mangil Kang, the National Revolutionary Party of Korea and the United Front (Seoul: Hwapyungsa, 
1991), 238. 
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Sino-DPRK relations. The establishment the PRC-DPRK alliance was built on the 
foundation of life and bloodshed in terms of shared experience of the anti-Japanese 
movement during the Civil War. 
2. Reason for the Establishment of Security Alliance 
The “sealed in blood” characterization of the PRC-DPRK relationship was 
solidified during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. In that period, PRC struggled with 
domestic problems, such as reorganization of political structure, economic reconstruction 
and mop-up operations against the Kuomintang.39 Many Chinese Communist leaders had 
serious reservations about and strongly opposed intervention in the Korean War. That 
notwithstanding, Mao decided to participate in Korean War to bolster a strategic 
objective securing its position in international order and concerns about an unstable 
security environment caused by U.S. occupation of the Korean peninsula. In particular, 
U.S. occupation of the Korean peninsula meant direct collision with the United States. 
Thus, Beijing declared that supporting North Korea was closely related to defending 
indispensible interests of Chinese people, according to a telegram that Mao set to Stalin 
in October 2, 1950.40 Moreover, China’s slogan, “Resist America and support Korea, 
Defend the homeland” (抗美援朝，保家 国), illustrated Beijing’s decision as derived 
from bolstering its national security. 41  
Table 2.   The PRC’s Losses in the Korean War.42 
 History of The Anti-American War to Support North Korea 
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Summary Statistics of UN 
Casualties 382,500 486,995 900,000 
 
                                                 
39 Chaejin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic relations (California: Hoover Press Publication, 1996), 7. 
40 Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and Korean War 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 177.  
41 Taeho Park, The History of Foreign Relations of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, 
(Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1985), 114. 
42 Yonghyun Ahn, The Secret History of Modern War 5 (Seoul: Kyungin, 1992), 50. 
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Table 3.   Dispatched PLA Army in the Korean War43 











Strength 25 70 25 3 12 2.3 Millions 
 
That is, with perception of a U.S. threat, the PRC chose to establish a special 
“Sealed in Blood” relationship with DPRK in order to defend interests from external 
threats during the period of war. After war, they agreed to establish a treaty of alliance for 
mutual support and cooperation.  
However, before they established their official alliance treaty in 1961, the PRC 
and DPRK maintained a de facto alliance without a formal treaty. They formalized this 
de facto alliance in July 1961 when Beijing and Pyongyang signed a “Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.” From the PRC’s perspective, the major 
reason for the official alliance formation was Sino-Soviet discord. Beijing needed firm 
support from Pyongyang in order to get superior position in Sino-Soviet relations. 44 
Thus, the PRC gave North Korea positive economic and military support because the 
DPRK’s opinion, as one of major communism countries, served as important variable 
that would decided which of the giant states would hold the main field in communist 
politics. The DPRK, throughout Sino-Soviet dispute, successfully exploited the Sino-
Soviet split by playing the two communist giants off against each other. In this way, the 
DPRK was able to gain economic and political benefits from both its neighbors.45 
In brief, the establishment of the treaty in 1961 was due to (1) secure China’s self-
interest in the region and (2) seeking an advantage in competition with the Soviet Union. 
                                                 
43 The Chinese Academic of Social Science, Modern Chinese Military Operation Part 1(1) (Beijing: 
The Chinese Academic of Social Science, 1989), 577. 
44 Savagem Tomothy L, “China’s Policy toward North Korea,” International Journal on World Peace 
20 (September 2003): 29–30. 
45 Ibid., 30. 
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B. CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTION OF TREATY 
1. Characteristics of Treaty 
On July 11, 1961, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and DPRK Premier Kim Ilsung 
signed the “Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance” in 
Beijing. To understand the characteristics of the treaty, the provisions of the treaty should 
be assessed first. Its specific features include compulsion, immediate adoption, and 
ideological traits. This is because it was to respond to the “Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.” The treaty is 
composed of seven articles. Implications of major Articles II, III and IV are analyzed 
as below.  
Article II emphasizes that “the contracting parties undertake jointly to adopt all 
measures to prevent aggression against either of the contracting parties by any state” and 
declares that “in the event of one of the contracting parties being subjected to the armed 
attack by any state, the other party shall immediately render military and other assistance 
by all means at its disposal.”46 The most important element of this article is that each side 
will “immediately render military and other assistance by all means.” Compared to other 
treaties, it does not designate a specific condition and country. Namely, its purpose was 
to prepare a response to immediate conformity with western countries, including the 
United States.47 
Article III stipulates that “neither contracting party shall conclude any alliance 
directed against the other contracting party or take part in any bloc or in any action or 
measure directed against the other contracting party.”48 This article levied a huge burden 
on the PRC because it limited establishing unconstrained foreign relationships. After the 
end of Cold War, as the PRC’s desire to improve its position in international order 
                                                 
46 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Article II, Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles of Chinese 
Foreign Policies (Indiana: Author House, 2008), 492. 
47 Yongjin Cho, “China’s Alliance Policy toward North Korea in Post Cold War era,” The Journal of 
International relationship (1995): 126. 
48 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea article III, Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles, 492.  
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increased, Beijing was pursued an omni-directional diplomacy to address its national 
security interests. 49  Therefore, changes in circumstances and domestic political, 
economic requirements, necessity of treaty revision appeared. However, looking back at 
the history of relations between the PRC and DPRK, they externally underline friendly 
relations even in dissension situation. For example, when Kim Ilsung died in 1994, Jiang 
Zemin stated that the PRC and DPRK would continually advance together in order to 
achieve permanent peace in Korean peninsula with Kim Jongil as the central figure in 
accordance with the will of Kim Ilsung.50 Judging from this, Beijing’s strategic priority 
on the DPRK as a political and ideological companion did not change. 
Article IV states, “the contracting parties will continue to consult with each other 
on all important international questions of common interest to the two countries.” 
However, reaching a complete agreement between individual countries is impossible 
when a wide variety interests are entangled in international society. Not only that, in 
Article VII, it is said that “the treaty will remain in force until the contracting parties 
agree on its amendment or termination,” in contrast to the 1961 treaty between the USSR 
and DPRK.51  
Finally, treaty between the PRC and DPRK has special value beyond cooperation 
in terms of permanent validity, guaranty of military assistance and blood brotherhood. 
                                                 
49 Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles, 492. 
50 Dan Lee, “Changes of DPRK-China Relationship,” 38. 
51 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea article IV, Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles, 492. 
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Table 4.   Comparison of Treaties Between the  
PRC-DPRK and USSR-DPRK 52 
 Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance 
Soviet Union-Korean Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance 
Yr 11 July 1961 6 July 1961 
Main 
agreement 
Immediately rendering military and other assistance by all means in the event of one of 
the contracting parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state 
Not concluding or taking part in any alliance directed against the other Party  
Amendment 
of treaty 
Valid until both parties agree on its 
amendment or termination 
Valid 10 years from the beginning day of 
treaty; after that, renewal every 5 years 
Present 
Status 
No mutual/public announcement of 
Change in treaty status 
Terminated in Sep, 1996 
 
Functions of Treaty 
The PRC-DPRK treaty has many functions. First of all, it guarantees national 
security interests between two countries. From Pyongyang’s perspective, a major effect 
of treaty is that the DPRK is secured from external threats. China undoubtedly is its most 
important ally, and has the military and political capability to deter any military action 
from the US, ROK, and Japan. 53  Nonetheless, Beijing also considers the Korean 
peninsula a special region as far as in ensuring China’s interests. In terms of geopolitical 
stability, a roughly 1,300km border line is shared with the DPRK. Moreover, the DPRK 
has like politics, many similar institutions, and ideology to the PRC.54 Finally, Beijing 
has made an effort to secure survival of the DPRK on the grounds that the PRC’s national 
interest is associated with existence of Kim Ilsung’s regime. China considers the DPRK a 
buffer zone that maintains the stability of northern and eastern regions. 55 In addition, 
ethnic Koreans living in China’s northeastern provinces have a close relationship with 
                                                 
52 Ministry of Unification, Monthly North Korea Trend, (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2000).  
53 Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 
2009, Http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html, (accessed October 1, 
2010). 
54 Dan Lee, “Changes of DPRK-China Relationship,” 26. 
55 Ibid., 37. 
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North Korea and maintaining friendly relationship with them is helpful to reduce any 
potential Korean ethnic domestic conflict in China.  
Briefly, unilateral military and economic assistance to the DPRK stemmed from 
judgment that protecting Pyongyang from intervention by the surrounding powers and 
aiding the DPRK regime and its sovereignty have been essential to a favorable security 
environment for China.  
Secondly, their treaty enables the two countries to cooperate in the international 
arena. Based on Article IV, whenever a crisis or problem happens, they develop their 
response through high-level talks. Finally, a major function of treaty has been to maintain 
the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Establishment of the PRC-DPRK treaty 
expanded the possibility of intervention and leverage for the two great Communist 
powers. For example, after World War II, and at the beginning the Cold War era, 
diplomatic tension between the U.S.-Japan security treaty and both the PRC and USSR 
was the defining political structure in the East Asian region.56 Under these conditions, the 
establishment of Sino-DPRK and the Soviet-DPRK treaty in 1961 created a triangle of 
socialist cooperation against bilateral treaties Washington had already concluded both 
with ROK in 1953, and with Japan in 1951 and 1960. The balance of power and mutual 
deterrence, therefore, were maintained through these treaty efforts with the DPRK. 
However, Since the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute deepened and Beijing 
reconciled with Washington. 57  Even though Sino-Soviet cooperation weakened and 
evolved into a new triangular cooperation among China, the United States and even (to 
some extent) Japan, the relationship between the PRC and DPRK still reflected the 
classic characteristics of the Cold War. It still served to keep the balance of power in 
Northeast Asia, At least from the PRC and DPRK perspective. As a result, the alliance 
between the PRC-DPRK has continued. 
                                                 
56 Soo Lee, “North Korea and Chinese Relation after Normalization of South Korea-China Relation,” 
(Master’s thesis, Sungkyunkwan University, 2008), 11. 
57 Yongho Kim, “Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Allinace: Beijing’s Declining Credibility and 
Pyongyang’s Bandwagoning with Washington,” Issues & Studies 37, no. 2 (March/April 2001), 151. 
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C. DETERMINANTS OF THE PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE 
1. The Cold War System 
A wide variety of factors influenced establishment of the PRC-DPRK alliance. In 
particular, East-West tension served as main catalyst. After World War II, international 
society faced turning point. With the end of World War II, enormous communist political 
power, such as communization of Eastern Europe under the control of the Soviet Union 
and the communization of China, appeared on the stage of international politics.58 In this 
transition, international order became bipolar. The Cold War system had three 
characteristics.59 First of all, ideological thought shaped the emerging international order 
and relationships among countries. Confrontation among countries was recognized at the 
level of ideological competence and conflict rather than level of traditional national 
interests. International society, on both sides, subsequently simplified the framing of this 
confrontation as the struggle between virtue and vice. Secondly, the Cold War system 
served to suppress national interests and even the national identity of individual 
countries. As a result, the United States and USSR established hegemony in the name of 
collective security and ideological unity. Finally, the United States and USSR directly or 
indirectly became involved in most conflicts and disputes in the world. There now was 
possibility that regional conflicts always might explode into international crises. Such 
facts played a significant role in tight-knit relationship between the PRC and DPRK. 
2. Geo-Political Factors 
In addition, geo-political factors affected China’s strategic posture toward the 
Korean peninsula.60 The Korean peninsula shares a border with China on the Yalu and 
Tumen rivers. From a Chinese perspective, the Korean peninsula is on the immediate  
 
                                                 
58 Dan Lee, “Changes of DPRK-China Relationship,” 76. 
59 Jinyoung Seo, Policy Prospect and interests of four countries around the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: 
Ministry of Unification, 1992), 171. 
60 Geo-politic is scholarship analyzing how geographical condition  fundamentally influence on 
authority of international politics. Deoksun Lim, Geopolitics (Seoul: Buebmoonsa, 1999). 
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periphery of its territory.61 Thus, the PRC regarded the Korean peninsula as a shield for 
China; in particular China’s central industrial and political districts, Northeast and north 
China.62 
In the Ming and Qing era, China considered other countries’ invasions of the 
Korean peninsula a greater threat than invasions of mainland China’s coast. 63  The 
Chinese recalled that Korea was the route by which imperial Japan launched its invasion 
of the Chinese mainland in the early twentieth century. In its traditional view toward the 
Korean peninsula, China did not occupy or force political dependency as long as the 
Korean peninsula stayed friendly. However, if an aggressive country dominated the 
Korean peninsula, it was recognized as threat to China. Therefore, it tended to manage or 
control the Korean peninsula. 64  China’s sense of vulnerability along the Korean 
peninsula was reinforced by swift U.S. intervention in the Korean War.65 Present Chinese 
leaders follow this classical view toward Korea. Jiang Zemin told his North Korean hosts 
in September 2001, during a three-day visit to Pyongyang, that because China is “close to 
the Korean peninsula, China is always concerned about the development of the situation 
on the peninsula and has consistently worked to maintain peace and stability on the 
peninsula.” 66  North Korea’s geopolitical position also makes it emphasize that the 
DPRK and China are directly connected with each other, while specific environment, 
division of peninsula, pushes North Korea to drift away from friendly relationship with 
other countries. 
                                                 
61 Kitaek Lee, Theory of Modern International Politics (Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 1997), 329–336. 
62 Samuel S. Kim, “The Changing Role of China on the Korean Peninsula,” International Journal of 
Korean Studies 8, no.1 (Fall/Winter 2004): 81. 
63 Werner Levi, Modern China’s Foreign Policy (Minnesota Polis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1956), 360. 
64 CP Fitzgerald, Chinese View of their Place in World (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).  
65 Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: the close but uncomfortable relationship,” Current 
History 101 (September 2002): 279. 
66 Ibid., 279 
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3. Sino-Soviet Split 
Another major determinant was the Sino-Soviet split. At the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union twentieth Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev argued that peaceful 
co-existence with imperialism is possible and that war between the West and East could 
be avoided.67 However, Beijing did not agree with Khrushchev’s view because China 
was confronted Taiwan as well as U.S. military threats. 68  Moreover, Khrushchev 
condemned China’s artillery attacks against Taiwan in 1950s and after meeting with 
Eisenhower and he withdrew the proposal of supporting of China’s Nuclear Weapon 
development program. Mao Zedong regarded Moscow’s behavior as intervention in 
China’s domestic affairs. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956 had also 
intensified the split between the PRC and USSR. Mao was concerned about possibility 
that he would be criticized like Stalin. As a result, Mao believed that Khrushchev’s line 
was heresy and could threaten Chinese political structure. From 1960 to 1988, Soviet 
Union withdrew all military and economic assistance to the PRC, including nuclear 
weapon development. 
As the dispute deepened, China was strategically in trouble. In the early 1950s, 
China had tried to prepare for the war against the United Sates and achieve military and 
economic development through alliance with Soviet Union.69 However, Beijing now had 
to revise its initial plan due to conflict with Moscow and detent between the United States 
and the USSR in the late 1950s. In this situation, China tried to strengthen its strategic 
position by allying with Pyongyang. The positive effects of such an alliance were as 
follows:  
First of all, China could reinforce the relationship with Pyongyang as “buffer 
zone” in preparation against any U.S military threat, especially given that Washington 
already had helped Taiwan strengthen its military capability after signing up a mutual 
                                                 
67 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton & Company, Inc, 1990), 
586. 
68 Steven M. Goldstein, “Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Chinese 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, eds., Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (New York: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 237. 
69 Mori Kasuko, China and Soviet Union (Seoul: Saminseokak, 1989), 76. 
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defense treaty in 1954.70 Secondly, China would not leave North Korea under influence 
of Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union tried to dispatch its military into the North Korea or 
control Pyongyang, Beijing would face a sticky wicket strategically. On the other hand, if 
China had the greater influence in North Korea, it would serve safeguard that could 
prevent Moscow from exerting influence.71  Finally, China welcomed the support of 
North Korea to sustain Mao’s ideological legitimacy. As Mao saw the denunciation of 
Stalin, establishing an anti-Soviet front line with Kim Ilsung would help reinforce his 
own (Mao’s) political position.72 
4. Similarity of Political System Between the PRC-DPRK 
In addition, the similarity of political systems in the two countries was also a 
determinant. Stephen White compared Western democratic states with communist states 
using four standards. First, every communist country is based on Marxism-Leninism. 
This ideology is the foundation of politics as well as basis of authority. Secondly, their 
economies all are managed by government plan. The central government makes a plan 
and decides the process for development of the country. Thirdly, sovereignty belongs to 
mono-political party. Finally, the party/government regulates the judicial branch, the 
press, and even labor. Using this standard, the political similarities between the PRC and 





                                                 
70 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
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71 Kitaeck Lee, Modern International Politics (Seoul: Ilsinsa, 1986), 469. 
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Table 5.   Comparison of PRC-DPRK Political Systems 
 Communist Countries The PRC The DPRK 
Official Ideology Marxism / Leninism Mao Zedong Thought Juche Idea 




Communist Party / 
Authoritarianism 




Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed 
 
The PRC and DPRK have similar political systems. Their political regimes are 
both based on proletarian revolution, and the Chinese Communist leadership views this 
common approach as important, and linked to the Chinese regime’s political legitimacy. 
That is, the continued existence and health of North Korea is of considerable 
importance.74 Even though the names of parties are different—Chinese Communist Party 
and Workers Party of Korea—they have a commonality with each other in terms of  
principles and doctrine. This extends beyond (historically similar) planned economies, 
but also extends to similar past political situations. Both have been divided nations and 
unification under communism is their ultimate regime goal(s).  
D. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the PRC and DPRK was bonded by stong cultural and 
social influences. More than half-century of battlefield cooperation significantly 
influenced their alliance.75  In addition, the PRC and DPRK bonded in their shared 
Leninist ideologies and their divided nation identities: the separation of North Korea from 
South Korea on the Korean peninsula and the separation of the PRC on the mainland 
                                                 
74 Scobell, “China and North Korea,” 278. 
75 Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: From Comrades in Arms to Allies at Arm’s length,” 
Strategic Study Institution (March 2004): 1–2. 
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from the Republic of China on Taiwan.76 Such shared interests and identities between 
two countries have helped them achieve close relations. Moreover, international political 
environments, such as the Cold War and Sino-Soviet dispute, helped them pursue 
friendly relations as well.  
From Beijing’s perspective, alliance with Pyongyang has brought about several 
advantages. First of all, China could utilize North Korea as a buffer zone between China 
and the military forces of the United States and its allies.77  Secondly, allying with 
Pyongyang prevented China from ideological split and provided Beijing with dominant 
position in communist world, and in the competition with Soviet Union. In brief, Beijing 
chose the alliance with Pyongyang in order to guarantee China’s survival and secure its 
national interests.78 
 
Figure 1.   Determinant of the Alliance Between the PRC and DPRK 
                                                 
76 Dick K. Nanto et al., “China-North Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Report for Congress, R41043 (January, 2010): 5, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf, (accessed 
September 28, 2010). 
77 Scobell, “China and North Korea,” 275. 
78 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 157–158. 
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III. THE CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENT FACTORS OF THE 
PRC-DPRK ALLIANCE 
China’s policy toward the DPRK has headed toward expanding universality and 
minimizing specialty in accordance with domestic and international changes since the 
late 1990s. Considering these points, the PRC-DPRK alliance is now more uncomfortable 
than in to the past. Above all, new Chinese leaders have shown a skeptical concern 
toward North Korea’s security situation—and its political and economic situation. Sino-
South Korea normalization at the end of the Cold War has affected the relationship 
between the PRC and DPRK. China now is more focused on becoming a constructive 
arbitrator between the United States and Korean peninsula in the Northeast Asian region.  
Beijing now would rather employ flexible policies toward North Korea in order to 
maintain a positive relationship with other countries. Eventually, the PRC-DPRK alliance 
faces a qualitative transition with greater stress on realism than ideology, preparing for 
the future rather than looking back on the traditional relationship, and also promoting 
institutional cooperation rather than personal ties. In the following section, I will review 
adjustments in the PRC-DPRK alliance in terms of changes the international 
environment, Chinese domestic economy policy, and diplomatic ties with South Korea. 
A. CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ENVIRONMENT AND ITS 
EFFECTS. 
1. Changes in International Politics: End of the Cold War 
The bipolar axis of international politics after WW II was altered with 
Khrushchev’s declaration of the peaceful coexistence line and first détente in 1970s.79 
However, this movement did not begin an earnest détente because the West did not 
seriously accommodate it. True détente, therefore, was not found until the appearance of 
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Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and his policies for making peace based on new thinking.80 
These transitions helped dissolve the structure of the Cold War, and the distinctions of 
ideological confrontation, the root of the Cold War, disappeared after 1989. The Warsaw 
Pact was dismantled in 1991, and in the West, event the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) began fundamental reorganization to reflect the changes.81 The 
significance of military and security issues weakened, characteristics of alliances 
changed, and even equalized in some cases, based on how individual countries defined 
their national interests. 82  Relationships among countries are now changed more by 
considerations of economic gain and loss than by differing ideology.  
Changes in the international order were based on four characteristics. First of all, 
international order switched to a U.S.-centered multi-polar system after the collapse of 
the USSR, and equalitarianism was magnified in the alliance system rather than order of 
rank among countries. Second, as function of ideology was weakened among Eastern 
bloc countries, existing socialist countries engaged in practical diplomacy, with the 
objective of maximizing national interests. Third, efforts to construct security 
communities spread with the aim of achieving regional collective security. Finally, 
instead of ideology, economic profits had gained significant influence on countries’ 
relationships.83  
The characteristics of international relationships from the post-Cold War era also 
have affected Chinese alliance policies with North Korea. First of all, the strategic value 
of North Korea has lessened. In the Cold War era, North Korea was important to China in 
the frame of the confrontation between the capitalist and communist worlds, as well as in 
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the frame of internal conflict within communist bloc and Sino-Soviet split.84 However, 
the collapse of the Cold War system diminished the strategic value of North Korea. 
Secondly, China focused more on “low politics,” such as trade, investment, and technical 
cooperation rather than “high politics” related to military concerns.85 Such features were 
reflected in China’s policies toward the DPRK. China’s adoption of this “practical” 
diplomacy caused changes in its relationship with North Korea in the form of decreasing 
military and political assistance.  
2. Changes in International Politics: Sino- Soviet Reconciliation  
The specific international environment of the confrontation of communist and 
capitalist worlds gave North Korea a strategically important position. North Korea also 
possessed a great strategic value in the Sino-Soviet split. The end of the Cold War, 
however, cost Pyongyang its position of strategic importance. North Korea also was 
deprived of the status of buffer state at least partially as a result of the reconciliation 
between Beijing and Moscow.  
First, the Sino-Soviet reconciliation produced transitions in the triangular relation 
among the PRC, USSR and DPRK. In the early 1980s, the USSR lost international 
support in the Soviet-Afghan war, and existing Eastern European satellites began to 
detach from the influence of the USSR in the name of reformation. The USSR was in a 
predicament. As a result, Moscow tried to recover its friendly relationship with Beijing 
and overcome its adverse bi-polar international political struggle against Washington. At 
the beginning of 1980s, there seemed to be some chances for Communist nations’ fence-
mending. 86 In March 1982, at the speech in Tashkent, the USSR Secretary Brezhnev 
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be mended by negotiation toward the PRC. In response to Moscow’s gesture, Deng 
Xiaoping looked forward. As a result, semi-annual meetings between deputy foreign 
ministers of both countries began in October 1982.87 
As Sino-Soviet relations began to thaw, Beijing’s perspective toward Pyongyang 
shifted. Beijing recognized that Gorbachev’s efforts to relieve East-West tension would 
alleviate the security threat in the Northeast Asian region. In 1989, Deng Xiaoping and 
Gorbachev held a summit for the first time since Mao and Khrushchev had held a summit 
in 1959.88 As a result, PRC-DPRK relations dacayed. 
Second, from Pyongyang’s perspective, the Sino-Soviet reconciliation and end of 
Cold War meant losses of benefits that they had enjoyed in the on bi-polar system. 
Economic, military, and political assistance and advantage from the Communist world 
were lost, which meant Pyongyang also lost its friendly strategic environment.89 These 
changes forced Pyongyang to readjust its relationship with traditional allies. Moscow and 
Pyongyang discarded their existing security treaty in 1996 and negotiated a new treaty in 
2000.90 Notwithstanding, Beijing started to consider North Korea a needed objective to 
make peaceful, stable environment rather than strategic priority for its economic 
development. Beijing’s accommodation with Moscow moved that relationship from 
hostile rivalry to companion.91 Eventually, China strategically stood at a flexible position 
on the stage of international politics. 
3. Effect of Changes in International Politics on the PRC-DPRK 
Alliance 
Throughout the period of these changes, and consistently over time, Pyongyang 
has strongly opposed capitalism and the Western bloc. Kim-Ilsung declared that the 
DPRK “must advance and guard socialism for great achievement” in the Pyongyang 
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announcement of April, 1992.92 He also stated, through the editorial column of official 
daily news, that “imperialists and reactionaries are arguing sophistry in order to beautify 
and propagate their ideology.” He said, “We must achieve victory by protecting 
socialism, but if we throw it away, there will be only death.”93 Antagonisms like these 
against the West and capitalists overflowed in Pyongyang without surcease. 
Pyongyang, however, did not want to strain its relationship with Beijing. On a six-
day official visit to the PRC in November 1990, Youn Hyungmook, premier of the 
DPRK, met with Li Peng, Premier of the PRC. Youn requested an economic assistance 
agreement and invited Li Peng to Pyongyang, and in a conference with Chinese high 
ranking officials emphasized his belief the “relationship between the two countries would 
never be changed by any transition in international society.”94 
After Youn’s visit, Li Peng visited the DPRK for four-days in May 1991 and 
discussed international trends on the Korean peninsula, such as South Korea-USSR 
normalization and Korea’s joining the UN. Even though Li Peng clarified that there 
would be no changes in China’s policies toward North Korea, he implied that China 
wanted to establish a new relationship with Pyongyang because he also emphasized that 
China’s open policy would be continued and suggested North Korea’s participation in 
economic reform.95 Pyongyang believed that China’s effort at economic reform was too 
excessive. However, in order to avoid friction that might cause diplomatic isolation, 
Pyongyang refrained from criticizing China’s economic policy. From the DPRK’s 
perspective, the end of the Cold War and transition in China’s national policies 
diminished its security assistance from major alliances. In particular, Pyongyang already 
suffered from a shortage of food and an energy crisis in the 1990s, so it was impossible 
for North Korea to improve its capabilities for national security. The new international 
order meant a collapse of alliances as well as a negative strategic environment for the 
DPRK.  
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China’s decreased threats caused by the end of the Cold War created transitions in 
the PRC-DPRK security alliance. As China was not threatened by potential and present 
enemies, its alliance with the DPRK did not serve its original role. As a result, even as 
North Korea’s threat recognition was increased, the PRC-DPRK alliance was weakened.  
B. CHINA’S OPEN DOOR POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A new approach toward foreign dealings was discussed at high-level Chinese 
leadership meetings in May 1992 and resulted in a comprehensive program under the 
guidance of the State Council. China began a major new stage in its policy of opening to 
the outside. 96  That document, entitled “The CCP Central Committee’s Opinions on 
Expediting Reform, Opening Wider to the Outside World, and Working to Raise the 
Economy to a new level in a better and Quicker Way,” was intended to be the “Magna 
Carta” of economic reform for the next 100 years.97 With Beijing’s effort to reform its 
economic system, friction between the PRC and DPRK increased. 
1. Origin and Process of China’s Open Door Policy  
Since the 1978 economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping opened up China to trade 
and foreign investment, Chinese elites had aimed to change fixed socialism into flexible 
socialism through economic modernization and growth, overcoming a “century of shame 
and humiliation.”98 China’s economy underwent a major structural transformation from 
the closed, planned, Soviet-style programs of the Maoist period to a decentralized, open-
market style economy. 99  China’s economic reform invited foreign investment and 
technology, overcoming differences of ideology and political systems. It also spurred 
Chinese economic growth and progress by combining foreign investments with domestic 
resources. 
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Deng declared that “China’s reform policy is turned in my hand and Chinese 
reform policy should continue under basis of independent self reliance.” 100  He 
recognized that modernization of Chinese socialization was possible if they continued an 
open-door policy in foreign relations.  
In order to attract foreign capital, China established special economic zones on 
the South China coast in 1979 near Hong Kong and opposite Taiwan. By building a 
favorable condition for the exploitation of Chinese labor and the making of quick profits, 
China rapidly improved its productive capability and accelerated foreign investment.101 
Although Beijing reviewed its open door policy after Tiananmen Crisis to solve problems 
that derived from reform process (such as the gap between the rich and poor and public 
corruption), Deng Xiaoping argued that pursuing more rapid economic growth could 
stabilize the domestic landscape and diminish the influence of external changes.102 He 
famously asserted at this time that it did not matter whether a cat was black or white as 
long as it caught mice. 
With this distinction, Deng opened the theoretical foundation for a socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics. In October 1992, the CCP’s fourteenth 
National Congress adopted a “socialist market economy” as the mainland’s new 
economic system. 103  Also, in November 1993, in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s 
“Whirlwind”104, a “Decision on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of Socialist 
Market Economic Structure” was adopted by the Third Plenary session of the CCP’s 
fourteenth Central Committee, initiating an ambitious reform program.105  
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The process of establishment of Chinese market economy system theory is as 
follows. 
Table 6.   The Process of Establishment of Chinese Socialist Market System Theory106 
Year Speaker Content 





Socialistic economy means pursuing planned economy based on shared economy  
Socialistic economy is not completely managed by “invisible hand” 
1985.10 Deng Xiaoping 
We need to combine planned economy and market economy 
There are no contradictions between socialism and market economy 




There is market economy system within socialism 
Plan and market should achieve integration 
1989.6 Deng Xiaoping 
China constantly tries to combine planned economy and market economy 
China has to clearly control market functions and plan in accordance with practical needs 
1990.12 Deng Xiaoping 
Socialistic economy could have market, capitalism also have plan. 
Planned economy does not mean socialism 
1992. 6 Deng Xiaoping Plan and market, both are methods to develop economic growth 
1992.12 Jiang Zemin Objective of economic reform is to build socialistic market economic system. 
 
Constructing market economy system is a major element in the success of 
speeding up “reform and opening,” as well as stepping stone in its economy. Through this 
process, China set out its own theoretical basis for intensive economic reform.  
2. Conflict between the PRC-DPRK on Open Door Policy  
From the perspective of post-Mao reform and opening to China, the South Korean 
economy represented opportunities to be exploited, whereas North Korea posed a burden 
to be lessened without damaging geopolitical ties or causing system collapse. 107 
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China’s attitude toward change made Pyongyang uncomfortable. Expansion of 
contacts and increased trade between the PRC and ROK meant North Korea began to lose 
ground. At the same time, the PRC and ROK came into a closer relationship in the name 
of economic cooperation and participation in international sports competition, Pyongyang 
decided to keep pace with Soviet decision when setting up its foreign policy direction. In 
this context, signs of significant negative changes in the relationship between the two 
countries continued. Since China raised the “initial stage of socialism” in 1981, 
Pyongyang started to criticize Chinese “reform and opening” policy. In particular, in June 
1999 in an official column, Kim Jongil argued, “It is important to trample anti-socialist 
elements before they come in sight.”108 This perception showed denial and rejection of 
Chinese market system theory.  
However, from North Korea’s perspective, China’s support and assistance was 
needed to maintain its regime and sovereignty. Therefore, Pyongyang indicated that 
North Korea would give wholehearted support to China’s reform policy and respect the 
people’s choice in order to make a favorable relationship between both countries. That is, 
the relative degree of intimacy depended on necessities of the DPRK.  
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH SOUTH KOREA 
Under its “open policy,” the PRC aggressively pursued economic cooperation 
with the ROK. In the early 1980s, China started a non-political exchange through indirect 
trade; it accomplished normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992.109 
Since then, the PRC-ROK relationship has been rapidly expanding in political and 
economic fields, including military interchange in the late 1990s, while the PRC-DPRK 
relationship became qualitatively estranged. 
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1. The Sino-South Korean Normalization 
The PRC and ROK, which had severed all contact in 1970s, began non-
governmental trade in 1980s. After Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, both countries moved 
closer to each other.110 In particular, even though trade with Western countries, including 
the United States, was diminished by the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, trade between the 
PRC-ROK increased.111 The development of the PRC-ROK relationship in this way was 
triggered by domestic and international policies of both countries as well as international 
political transitions. In the late 1970s, declaring a new policy of economic reform and 
opening, China Communist leaders, including China’s paramount leader Deng ZXiaoping 
developed a more positive view toward South Korea. In the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang and then 
Communist Party of China Central secretariat General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, said in 
interviews with Greek and Yugoslavian communist papers, “China thoroughly goes deep 
into the development of South Korea because reform policies of the PRC are based on the 
experience of Korea.”112 South Korea also tried to embody “a Nord Politik” based on 
improved international status. 
Reflecting these changes in Chinese perceptions toward Korea and world political 
changes, economic trade between the PRC and ROK gradually increased. As China 
relieved controls of central planning and constructed special economic zone on its coast 
starting in 1985, relations between them improved. As a result, trade volume increased 
from $20 million in 1979 to $58 billion in 1991, moving toward a normalization of their 
relationship.113 Also, the form of economic trade evolved into direct trade and joint 
venture cooperation when investment of Korean capital expanded.114 
Finally, on August 24, 1992, Qian Qichen the State Councilor and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC and Yi Sang-Ok, foreign minister of the ROK, signed a six 
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points Sino-ROK joint communique in Beijing.115 With this effort, they built sufficient 
conditions for demonstrating economic potential in terms of geographical proximity, 
economic cooperation and reciprocity. This, and the subsequent formal establishment of 
diplomatic relations affected every area from the economy to culture, and the relationship 
between the two countries showed unparalleled historical development henceforward. 
国共产党中央委员会总书记(19801987) 
2. Present State of Mutual Exchange Between the PRC and ROK and 
Implications 
Establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and ROK formed a new 
political structure in Northeast Asia that transcended ideology. Political cooperation was 
especially activate. By diplomacy through leadership visits, including summit talks, these 
two countries outlined the future of mutual cooperation in the Northeast Asian region as 
well as other issues of the Korean peninsula. In March 1994, President Kim Youngsam’s 
visit to China achieved increased political credibility and understanding during the tense 
period of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The PRC and ROK agreed, in 
principle, on a reciprocal understanding and agreement to solve the nuclear crisis. This 
played a significant role in the process of resolving the 1994 nuclear crisis.116 In addition, 
in September 1994, the nuclear crisis subsided thanks to an agreement between the 
United States and DPRK; Li Peng, the PRC premier, then came to South Korea by 
invitation of President Kim Youngsam enriched the economic relationship and promoted 
a more stable security environment.117 
Both countries declared a goal to be cooperative partners in the twenty-first 
century, following up on the historic visits of Jiang Zemin to South Korea in 1995 and 
Kim Daejung to China in 1998. It was also an opportunity to expand the range of security 
cooperation on the Korean peninsula between both countries. In the 1990s, President Roh 
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Taewoo and Kim Youngsam also made efforts to strengthen the amicable relationship 
with Beijing with a summit talks.118 It was clear that leaders of both countries now had a 
shared interest in Sino-South Korea relations.  
Another effect was development of economic cooperation. On September 27, 
1992, President Roh and the ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the ORK Minister of 
the Commercial and Industrial Department visited China together with business leaders 
of the Korean economy.119 On September 30, they concluded a diverse cooperation 
agreement calling for bilateral investment. Bilateral economic cooperation got a firm 
boost by this treaty. Particularly, the establishment of an “economy, trade and technology 
committee” contributed to cooperation between the two countries; it transferred existing 
protection for private investment into an official agreement of the government.120 After 
establishment of relations, both sought to plan a regional economic cooperation 
organization.121 Trade volume between the two countries in 1992 was $63.79 billion. As 
time went by, trade volume continued to increase as follows.  
                                                 
118 Vang, Five Principles, 554–557. 
119 Sangcheol Lee, “China-South Korea Summit in Beijing,” Chosun Ilbo, September 28, 1992, 
http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_service/pdf_ReadBody.jsp?Y=1992&M=09&D=28&ID=9209280101, 
(accessed September 18, 2010). 
120 Vang, Five Principle, 546–547. 
121 Taehwan Lee, The Korean peninsula, 139. 
 39
Table 7.   Trade Statistic Table Between the PRC and ROK ($, Millions, %)122 
Year Export Import Total Rate of increase 
1990 585 2,262 2,847 39.2 
1991 1,003 3,441 4,444 55.8 
1992 2,654 3,725 6,379 43.5 
1993 5,151 3,929 9,080 42.3 
1994 6,203 5,463 11,666 28.5 
1995 10,293 6,689 16,982 44.8 
1996 12,481 7,499 19,980 20.4 
1997 14,929 9,116 24,045 20.6 
1998(1-10) 11,911 4,922 16,822 -11.5 
 
Even in an internationally stagnant economic situation, their trade volume reached 
$199.80 billion. Rate of increase was 20.4 percents compared to the previous year.123 In 
addition, according to statistical data provided by the ROK Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy (MKE), South Korean expected a target of 12.5 percent average annual growth 
of exports over the next six years. South Korean exports are projected to reach $410 
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Table 8.   South Korea’s Investment Toward China 1992–1996 (Unit: Billions)125 
Year Consultation of investment Actual investment 
1990 Number Amount Amount 
1978-1991 298 2.06 0.56 
1992 650 4.17 1.20 
1993 1,748 15.57 3.74 
1994 1,849 15.57 7.23 
1995 1,975 29.98 10.42 
1996 1,895 42.36 13.57 
Total 8,415 111,20 36,72 
 
Not only that, in 1994, the two countries established industrial collaboration 
committee in order to create strategic cooperation in 1994. They also opened more than 
ten air and sea routes. Judging from this, cooperation between the two countries meant 
that there were enormous changes in structural and qualitative aspects.  
3. Effect of Sino-South Korean Normalization on the PRC-DPRK 
Alliance 
Before the establishment of relationship with South Korea, the PRC-DPRK 
relationship gave all the appearances of being amicable. The highest CCP leaders, like 
Jiang Zemin in 1990, Li Peng, premier of the PRC, and Yang Shangkun, PRC president 
in 1991, visited North Korea. After the PRC’s establishment of the relationship with 
South Korea, however, the PRC and DPRK appeared to suspend summits for a 
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Table 9.   High Level Sino-DPRK Talks and Sino-ROK Talks(1987–2010) 126 
High level talks between 










     
1988  Yang Shangkun     
1989 Kim Ilsung Zhao Ziyang     
1990 Yeon Hyungmook Jiang Zemin     
1991 Kim Ilsung Li Peng     
1992  Yang Shangkun Roh Taewoo   
The Sino-ROK 
Normalization 






















1997       










2000 Kim Jongil      
2001 Kim Jongil Jiang Zemin     
2002      2nd Nuclear 
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High level talks between 





→DPRK ROK→PRC PRC→ROK Third State 
 
crisis 
2003       
2004 Kim Jongil      
2005  Hu Jintao     
2006 Kim Jongil  Roh Moohyun    
2007       
2008  Xi Jinping     
2009  Wen Jiabao    3
rd Nuclear 
crisis 





Pyongyang considered the Sino-South Korea normalization a betrayal, regardless 
of China’s stance, because Pyongyang took their “lips and teeth” relationship 
seriously.127 Pyongyang condemned Beijing through an official comment, saying that 
reinforcement of anti-imperialistic struggle was a basic requirement for completing the 
great socialist revolution. Pyongyang also said: “Recently, severe crisis has happened in 
which socialism was frustrated by the contemptible maneuvers of imperialists and a 
stratagem of apostates. Therefore, the most important thing is to enhance combative spirit 
against imperialism.”128 
The DPRK’s censure of Beijing was revealed by North Korea’s domestic actions. 
North Korea temporarily applied trade sanctions by consolidating custom inspections. 
Pyongyang delivered a protest to Beijing and notified China that its ambassador to the 
PRC would be recalled. North Korea also argued that social and cultural exchanges 
would be suspended. Actually, when Beijing requested that Kim Jongil visit China and 
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meet with Deng Xiaoping, Pyongyang declined this request. As a result, Chinese high 
ranking official’s visiting to celebrate for Kim Ilsung’s birthday also was cancelled.129 In 
response to the DPRK’s resistance, the PRC decided to not expand political and military 
relationship with the DPRK. In February 1993, Li Peng announced basic stance of policy 
toward the Korean peninsula; “China was not supposed to have any new political and 
military agreements with the DPRK. China would not be identified with creating tensions 
due to ideological conflict between the two Koreas. China also supported the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and talks for the unification of the Korean 
peninsula. China opposed providing the DPRK with advanced military equipment. Sino-
South Korea normalization and development of friendly relationship is one of the PRC’s 
foreign policies to build peaceful environment in Northeast Asia region.”130  
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin said that after the 
establishment of diplomatic relation with South Korea, “China will continue to develop 
the good-neighborly, friendly and cooperative relation with DPRK on the basis of the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence. The treaties and agreements signed between the two 
countries will remain unchanged.”131 That is, Beijing seemed to be free status in the 
relationship with North Korea as well as maintaining traditional relationship. This 
implied that China’s perspective toward the Korean peninsula changed from inclination 
toward North Korea in terms of political and military affairs to expanding China’s 
influence on the Korean peninsula.  
As everyone knows, third article of Sino-DPRK alliance treaty represented 
“Neither Contracting Party shall conclude any alliance directed against the other 
Contracting Party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure directed against the 
other Contracting Party” to regulate one’s foreign relations. 132  However, China 
established diplomatic relationship with the ROK. This fact meant that a common enemy 
                                                 
129 Leon V. Sigal, United State did not Intend to Cooperate (Seoul: Social Critics, 1999), 85. 
130 Cho, “China’s Alliance Policy,” 182. 
131 Department of Unification, Trend of North Korea (Seoul: Department of Unification, 1992), 47.  
132 “Sino-North Korea Alliance Treaty,” 
http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm, (accessed September 11, 2010). 
 44
does not exist anymore between the PRC and DPRK—even while the DPRK still views 
the ROK as a threat and false regime. Sino-South Korea normalization implied that China 
did not consider alliance with the DPRK as major diplomatic determinant.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The transition of China’s foreign policies was enabled by geopolitical factors 
associated with the end of the Cold War. The PRC, through bilateral and multilateral 
processes, resolved disputes along its long borders with Russia and the former-Soviet 
republics. The end of bipolarity dissipated Pyongyang’s leverage in both Moscow and 
Beijing. Furthermore, the decisive Soviet tilt in the waning days of the Soviet Union 
toward Seoul provided and escape for the PRC from the entrapment of its one-Korea 
policy, or at least a convenient cover for the policy shift.133  
Finally, with the ascendancy in 1978 of Deng Xiaoping as China’s paramount 
leader and then his inauguration of “an independent foreign policy line” in 1982, 
Beijing’s one-Korea policy began to be “de-ideologized.” China’s Korea policy began 
shifting from the familiar pro-Pyongyang one Korea policy, to a “one-Korea de jure / 
two-Koreas de facto” policy, and finally on 24 August 1992 to a policy of two-Koreas de 
facto and de jure, with the signing of a joint communiqué with South Korea.134 With the 
end of the Cold War and Sino-South Korea Normalization, the PRC’s political and 
economic relations with the PRC have expanded vigorously and dramatically.  
In addition, since Deng Xiaoping declared, “It is glorious to get rich,” China 
embraced free market economics. China has also tried to encourage its neighbor across 
the Yalu River to open to the outside world. Despite China’s effort to encourage an open 
policy within North Korea, the DPRK’s economy remains in a disastrous state. 
Moreover, the DPRK has even created some major security headaches. For China; and 
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from China’s standpoint, the nuclear threats by the DPRK toward the United States 
provided an excuse for (unwanted) U.S. troop deployments in the Korean peninsula.135 
While Beijing still maintains its alliance and continues its substantial economic 
assistance to Pyongyang, in recent 20 years, many PRC and North Korean interests and 
goals appear to have grown increasingly incompatible. North Korea has remained insular, 
highly ideological and committed to what many find to be a virtually suicidal economic 
policy direction. China, on the other hand, has rejected its past excesses of ideological 
zeal to become a pragmatic, competitive, market-driven economy that increasingly is a 
major economic and political player in the international system.136  
In brief, Sino-DPRK alliance seemed to have deteriorated on the grounds that 
changes in the international political environment as well as in Chinese domestic policy 
have caused friction with North Korea, which negatively affected the “Brotherhood” 
relationship between them. 
 
Figure 2.   Changes in the Relationship Between the PRC-DPRK. 
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IV. DURABILITIES OF THE ALLIACE BETWEEN THE PRC-
DPRK  
The preceding chapter analyzed to the changes and adjustment factors in the 
alliance between the PRC and DPRK. Their relationship seemed to be transformed from 
“a blood-tied alliance” to “normal relations,” due to rapid changes in international 
politics and Beijing’s domestic policies. Beijing, however, has continued to support 
North Korea politically.  
For example, recently, China supported North Korea’s stance toward the incident 
of the sinking of a South Korea naval ship in March 2010. Even though the United States 
and ROK demanded that China, as regionally responsible stake holder, clearly investigate 
the reason of sinking, China, nation with the most influence in the Northeast Asian 
region, had a noticeably tepid response and did not officially comment much about the 
results of the probe.137 Cui Tiankai, China’s deputy foreign minister, called the sinking of 
the South Korean warship Cheonan “unfortunate” and did not acknowledge North 
Korea’s responsibility.138  That is, China does not want to expand the effect of the 
accident through taking a harder line against North Korea. Such response highlights 
China’s special relationship with the DPRK. Beijing, as North Korea’s key partner and 
treaty ally, has kept the most leverage on Pyongyang of any world power. By maintaining 
the positive relationship with Pyongyang, China wants regional stability, the status quo of 
two Koreas, and peace in Northeast Asia in order to avoid hurt damage caused by North 
Korea, such as massive flood of refugees from, and to get more influence in the 
competition with the United States.139 
In brief, Beijing still recognizes Pyongyang’s role as instrument to increase 
China’s national interests. In this context, in the following chapter I will carry out an 
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analysis of what kind of factors have influence on China’s stance toward the alliance with 
North Korea, from Beijing’s national strategic objectives to the role of North Korea in 
embodying Beijing’s objective. An examination of Beijing’s perspective toward North 
Korea shows the PRC-DPRK alliance is recovered and developed as long as China gains 
its geopolitical interests of “North Korea’s regime survival and reform.”140 
A. CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IN TERMS OF 
FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
After more than a century of struggle with economic weakness and political 
turmoil, China entered the twenty-first century as a rising power thanks to the progress of 
market-oriented economic reform. 141  China’s rise has been seen as threat in some 
countries, like the United States. In addition, there have been some controversies over 
China’s role in international society. Some scholars have been alarmed and argue that a 
rising China makes itself a threat to Asian and global security because it may upset the 
balance of power. In particular, neo-Conservatives in U.S. President George W. Bush’s 
administration warned of the prospect of China as a great power to challenge American 
predominance in the post-Cold War world.142 In the contrast to this view, other scholars 
have held that China is a conservative power and will seek to maintain the status quo.143 
Chinese leaders already know these perceptions of China. Therefore, they try to show the 
positive effects of its rising, namely, as the PRC capabilities increase, its intentions will 
become more benign and its reform and growing economic interactions with the capitalist 
world will make it more open and democratic, which will help to promote international 
stability and security. However, China’s intentions are directly related to its real national 
strategic objectives, a powerful China, as a major force of stability, or a threat to 
international peace. But, in order to achieve its ultimate goal, China still lacks sufficient 
capability in terms of economy might and politics. Chinese leaders have recognized that 
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they are under many international and domestic constraints. Setting economic 
modernization as their top national objective, Chinese leaders have paid special attention 
to China’s economic relations with other countries. A continued stress on high growth 
rates through a deepening of open door policy will remain the essential goal of Chinese 
domestic policy because the economic arena will constitute the main domain of 
international competition in the future.144 Also, to embody its economic growth, stable 
environment is prerequisite.  
In addition to economic issues, China’s national objectives put a higher emphasis 
on hegemonic competition with the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, 
Chinese leaders have been confronting the United States on issues that China, as an 
emerging major power, wants to play a role in the world arena. Actually, Beijing stresses 
the search for strategic leverage and independence of action through the balancing and 
manipulation of economic, diplomatic, and military relations among both major and 
emerging powers.145 But it still lacks an adequate material basis to do so. Therefore, 
China needs a stable status to improve its capabilities continually, while it keeps the 
United States from expanding its influence in international society.  
Recently, however, China has increasingly challenged the United States interests 
and influenced the actions of smaller states, including those on the Korea peninsula.146 In 
this respect, North Korea remains a good instrument for Beijing because North Korea 
could serve as an effective intermediary for China. Because of its economic aid and 
geographic proximity, China is an essential interlocutor with North Korea.147 This fact 
makes China an important state with at least some influence or control toward North 
Korea; this allows China to maintain a long-term, if not predominant position in its 
Korean peninsula competition with the United States.  
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1. Implication of Pursuing Stable Economic Growth 
The fundamental purposes of China’s national strategy are to safeguard China’s 
national territory and sovereignty, to guide national construction and social development, 
to ensure continued national prosperity, and to strengthen national power.148 To achieve 
these national objectives, attainment of great power status in the economic realm is 
prerequisite. Moreover, the growth of the Chinese economy will help China establish 
international status and exercise its international role and influence.149 
China’s current development reflecting the contents and priorities of the Four 
Modernizations, the guiding principle of the reform effort inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping 
in the late 1970s, is enormous. China is now the third largest economic power in the 
world.  
 
Figure 3.   Distribution of World GDP (2008)150 
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In addition, with the growing economic links between the mainland, Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, China raises the prospect that the next 50 years will be China’s 
period, which will completely control the economy of world.151 
 
Figure 4.   GDP on a PPP Basis for China and the United States, 2000–2008 and 
Projections Through 2030 (2008)152 
Chinese leaders, however, still think they lack capability to compete with United 
States in economic arena. National per capita income is just over $3,000; that is among 
the lower levels newly industrializing countries. China’s GDP also is roughly 30 percent 
of the United States. Not only that, regionally unbalanced development and the gap 
between rich and poor are major factors creating frictions on the Chinese economy.153  
Table 10.   Comparisons of U.S. and Chinese GDP and Per Capita GDP in Nominal U.S. 








Per Capita GDP 
in PPP 
United States 14,441 14,441 47,496 47,496 
China 4,416 8,161 3,325 6,150 
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Therefore, in present situation, Beijing wants stable, sustained economic 
development. Economic power is closely related to securing national security objectives, 
such as securing territory and sovereignty. Eventually, economic power will contribute to 
building strong military capability which is an essential determinant for a state’s 
authority. China’s strategic dilemma, however, is compounded by ongoing developments 
in U.S. advanced technology and weapons acquisition and U.S. concentration of its 
overseas deployments in East Asia. These indicate that even if China should try to gain 
balance with U.S. power, the gap in military capabilities would, continue to grow. Even 
though China’s military’s budget has continued to increase at double-digit rates every 
year since 1993, the capabilities gap between the United States and China has not 
narrowed.155 
 
Figure 5.   Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2009156 
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Figure 6.   PRC Military Budget and Estimated Expenditure, 1996–2008 ($, Billion)157 
In view of the potential for a military conflict between the United States and 
China sometime in the future, over Taiwan or Korean peninsula issues, the PLA will 
continue to increase and enhance its operational capabilities.158 For example, after the 
Taiwan crisis of early 1996, when China’s decision to stage large-scale military exercises 
in the Strait of Taiwan during Taiwan’s presidential election led the United States to 
deploy two aircraft carrier task forces to the region, the Chinese leadership finally worked 
hard to restore normality with Washington. 159  This implies that China still has a 
continued interest in its burgeoning trade and technology transfer relationship with the 
United States. Not only that, it seems to argue that China is not an emerging monster only 
focusing only on its own interests. 
In brief, Chinese leaders recognize that China may be rising, but its rise is 
concurrent with the consolidation and expansion of American unipolarity, and China 
needs to enhance its fundamental economic structure in order to solve domestic economic 
imbalance and build other field abilities.   
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2. Hegemonic Competition With the United States 
In spite of China’s declared emphasis on peace and development and its avowed 
policy of befriending neighboring states in pursuit of a stable environment in which its 
Four Modernizations can proceed, the United States has a different view in approaching 
that emerging, giant state.160 Actually, many in the United States state that the leadership 
in Beijing has set goals that are “contrary to American interests.” Bernstein and Munro 
warned “driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the 
past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking to replace the United 
States as the dominant power in Asia.”161  
Since the late 1980s, Beijing has come to see the United States not as a strategic 
partner, but as the chief obstacle to its own strategic ambitions. 162 In particular, the post 
Cold-War era and its rising economic power, spur China to shape a new regional order in 
Asia. China needed to diminish American leverage in Northeast Asia, because Japan and 
the United States, are building up a military force projection capability to contain China’s 
front. This is an obstacle for Beijing and its desire to control South China and East China 
Sea, both regional essential sea-lanes163 
The war games conducted by China after Lee Deng-Hui’s visit to the United 
States in 1995 implied that China never gave up the use of force in order to secure its 
core interests. Moreover, some Chinese analysts express the view that American forces 
have no reason to remain on the Korean peninsula if tension were to be dissipated.164 
Except for shared common interests between the United States and China, such as 
containing North Korea’s nuclear program, U.S. troop presence on the peninsula will 
likely be viewed by Beijing as a source of potential conflict. Therefore, when Korea 
finally is reunified, China will likely press for the withdrawal of American forces from 
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Northeast Asia. It will use its influence in Northeast Asia for two purposes, both of them 
inimical to American interests: to bring about a pro-Chinese, anti American and anti-
Japanese stance in Korea, and to perpetuate Japan’s status as a non normal country, one 
without the right to assume primary responsibility for its own defense.165 
In terms of securing China’s national interests, such as the Taiwan Straits and 
essential sea lanes issues, China does not want to be seen as a paper tiger.166 Some 
analysts suggest that Beijing probably assesses that its approach to several issues that are 
related to the United States has a bearing on whether the international community 
considers China a threat or friend. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not want to be seen as 
interfering in the internal affairs of another sovereign country, a long-standing tenet of 
Chinese foreign policy that reflects its concern about other states meddling in its own 
affairs on issues like Taiwan and Tibet. On the other hand, Beijing also wants to make the 
United States look like a bullying hegemon in order to get benefits. In that way China can 
continue to nurture its own status in the region as an alternative to the United States. 
power structure.167  
Table 11.   Determinants of Confrontation Between the United States and China168 
 The United States’ perspective The PRC’s perspective 
Taiwan Issue 
Principally supports China’s “one 
China” policy 
Still supports Taiwan’s defense  
Taiwan issue is domestic political 
problem.  
Preclusion of U.S. intervention 
Human Right oppression in China Internal Interference 
Missile Defense The way to secure U.S interests in Asia to prepare for threat of hostile countries Hegemonic policy of the United States 
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As China seeks to a dominant position in the region, and does not want to share 
the United States’ view on global governance. China will try to alter existing rules and 
not allow the United States sole authority to define the limits of responsible sovereignty. 
China believes that it is entitled to reshape international arrangements to suit its own 
interests.169 
China has realized itself as a center gravity in the modern world. Its traditional 
leverage on neighbors and its inherent power are connected with its eagerness to 
overcome humiliating history and to move forward a dominant position in Asia of 
Asian.170 Its goals are to ensure that no country in the region will act without taking 
China’s interests into prime consideration: to achieve the paramount status in Asia and to 
prevent any single country from gaining overwhelming power in Asia. 171 In brief, it is 
clear that China has not and will not allow the established influence of the United States, 
which has three times war had in the Asian region since 1950, to remain unchecked 
B. NECESSITIES OF NORTH KOREA TO ACHIEVE CHINESE 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 
On 25, October 2010, at the sixtieth anniversary of volunteer army entering the 
DPRK to help in the war resisting U.S. aggression, Vice President Xi Jinping said that the 
Chinese movement 60 years ago was “a great and just war for safeguarding peace and 
resisting aggression. It was also a great victory in the pursuit of world peace and human 
progress.”172 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said that Xi Jinping’s 
remark is China’s official stance toward the Korean War at the press conference on 28 
October.173 
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Kim Jongil also remarked on that October 25, 2010, in a friendly meeting with 
Guo Boxiong, Vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commision that “the DPRK 
will always honor the feats of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) and will continue 
boosting the blood-forged bilateral friendship.” Kim and Guo agreed that both countries 
should continue to build consolidating friendship in order to improve peaceful 
environment of development.174 
In the context of such remarks, Beijing and Pyongyang still have positive 
relationship despite transitions in the international environment. In particular, recent 
issues such as the sinking of  the South Korea warship “Cheonan” and visits to China 
regarding succession of authority to Kim Jongeun, reflect China’s perspective toward 
North Korea. China thinks that North Korea is still closely linked to China’s primary core 
interests, especially preventing the United States from expanding its leverage in the 
region in the name of deterring proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
1. Maintaining Leverage in the Northeast Asia 
After mid 1990s, due to American “hegemonic” policy, China raised alerts toward 
the United States emerging as a superpower. In particular, U.S. foreign policies regarded 
China as potentially hostile country with beginning of Bush administration.175 As the 
United States tried to strengthen its alliance with Japan, Beijing perceived serious 
security threat because strengthening of the US-Japan alliance would curtail China’s 
diplomatic influence in Northeast Asia as well as accentuate the security burden in its 
eastern border region.176  
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To secure its leverage in the Northeast Asian region, China still needed to 
enhance its relations with the Korean peninsula. After Sino-South Korea normalization, 
relationship between China and South Korea developed by leaps and bounds. But as long 
as the U.S-South Korea’s alliance exists, Sino-South Korea relationship will have 
limitation. For Beijing, therefore, this highlighted strategic value of North Korea, even 
today and encouraged China to expand its diplomatic leverage.  
North Korea’s strategic value actually has increased as Pyongyang developed its 
nuclear capability through testing since 1989. In response to international efforts at 
keeping North Korea from having nuclear capability, Pyongyang signed onto “Joint 
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in December 1991.177 In 
January 1992, Pyongyang also signed a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA (International 
Atomic Agency).178 In spite of such agreements preventing North Korea from having 
nuclear weapons, Pyongyang denied the inspection of its nuclear facilities and seceded 
from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993. This was first North Korea 
nuclear crisis.179 This first nuclear crisis was resolved by consultation at Geneva in 1994 
between the United States and North Korea. These talks resulted in a resolution which is 
known as “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea,”180  In it North Korea pledged to freeze and eventually 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program, in exchange for aid, energy development support 
and increased recognition.  
Eventually, North Korea, however, still continued to make tension in the Korean 
peninsula. Moreover, in August 1998, Pyongyang fired a multistage rocket, Taepodong-
1, stimulating concerns by the surrounding countries and the United States. As North 
Korea demonstrated an increased capability to develop and launch long-range missiles, 
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North Korea was magnified as a more substantial threat. The reason Pyongyang focused 
on preparing deterrent capability was to assure its regime survival after Pyongyang 
witnessed regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq.181 Gradually, Second crisis of the 
Korean peninsula was resolved by process shown in Table 13.  
Table 12.   A Timeline on Nuclear Weapons Development in North Korea182 
 Major Events 
August 31, 1998 Launched long-range missile, Daepo-dong 1. 
November 17, 1998 First round of high-level talks in Pyongyang 
May 25-28, 1999 Former Defense Secretary William Perry visited North Korea 
September 13, 1999 
North Korea pledges to freeze testing of long-range missiles for the duration 
of negotiations to improve relations. 
September 17, 1999 President Clinton agreed to the easing of economic sanctions 
October 16, 2002 North Korea developed a secret nuclear weapons program 
January 7, 2003 North Korea second withdrew from the NPT 
August 27-29, 2003 First round of six party talks 
2004-2006 Numeral six party talks 
January 5, 2006 North Korea tested missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2 
October 9, 2006 
North Korea announced that it had performed a successful underground 
nuclear test 
February 13, 2007 
North Korea signed agreement to freeze its nuclear program at 5th six party 
talks  
The latest North Korea crisis occurred last year. First, in April 2009, North Korea 
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resolution 1718 and strengthened sanction against North Korea.183 Second, Pyongyang, 
additionally, declared that its second successful nuclear test completed was in May 
2009.184  
In the process of such consecutive crises, whether Pyongyang intended it or not, 
North Korea contributed to China’s national security. First of all, while China cooperates 
with the United States regarding North Korea’s nuclear issues, China has been able to 
focus on trying to gain getting concessions from the United States in terms of 
controversial issues, such as human rights. Secondly, North Korea’s development of 
nuclear weapons could further restrict the U.S. military’s room to take action in the 
Korean peninsula. This helps to constrain the range of U.S. policy choices toward China. 
Finally, for China, although any destabilizing action runs counter to its interests of 
economic development, 185  Pyongyang’s provocations provide China with a needed 
environment to act in accordance with its role as a “responsible stakeholder.” In 
particular, appearing to control North Korea by maintaining a positive relationship with 
Pyongyang enables Beijing to maximize its influence on the Korean peninsula as well as 
its leverage in Asia and with all the relevant parties in the Six Party talks. 
When the United States faced its second North Korea crisis, Washington 
continued to insist that multilateral talks with Pyongyang involve other surrounding 
countries. The Bush administration asked China to exert its influence on North Korea. It 
is true that China has significant more influence on North Korea than any other country. 
Therefore, China could arrange its strategic priorities according to its national interests 
and improve its position in foreign relationships. China facilitated, hosted, and 
participated in the six-party talks.186 In the six-party talks, China received considerable 
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credit for not only persuading North Korea to be more flexible on the issues, but also for 
getting the North Koreans to actually change. China persuaded North Korea become 
more open in its approach to dialogue with Washington. China seems to have become a 
more confident international actor, more willing to participate in both multilateral and 
bilateral settings.187 But China only acted according to its strategic priority in the case of 
North Korea’s nuclear action. In fact, prior to 2003, China had not taken an activist and 
leading role on the nuclear crisis. After China witnessed result of Iraq War and predicted 
consequences of a nuclear zed North Korea, leaders in Beijing seriously recognized the 
potential for an unstable environment on the Korean peninsula. A nuclear armed North 
Korea might trigger a desire in surrounding countries to develop their own nuclear 
deterrents and ballistic missile capabilities, spurring possible Japanese conventional 
rearmament as well as the U.S response providing robust security programs, including a 
missile defense program for U.S. friends and allies. Such proliferation of nuclear weapon 
states around China’s periphery might cause severe problems when China is willing to 
defend its national interests competing with surrounding countries.  
These factors were likely, or possibly the most likely, motivations for China to 
take an aggressive role in resolving nuclear crises. Regardless of the reasons, however, 
continuation of the Six-Party Talks process allows Beijing to expand its mediating role 
and offers it a potentially leading position. Also China’s role in hosting the Six Party 
Talks creates a delicate balancing act for Beijing with respect to its relations with the 
DPRK. The Hong Kong media reported, “China succeeded in persuading the DPRK to 
join the six party talks. So being the organizer of the talks is in itself a winner.”188 
Both the United States and China want the North Korean nuclear program 
eliminated. But whereas Washington places a high priority on this objective, Beijing 
seeks above all to preserve cordial relations with Pyongyang. Beijing fully recognizes 
Pyongyang’s security situation and its perception that it is completely surrounded by 
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nuclear powers or countries under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. So Beijing believes that 
pushing North Korea into a corner would produce an unstable security environment.  
Finally, China remains interested in maintaining the balance of power in the 
Korean peninsula and in playing the role of a mediator in an area that is strategically 
important to China’s security. Beijing also thinks that maintaining status quo is better for 
China than a unified Korean peninsula under U.S. friendly regime. Consequently, Beijing 
focuses on its primary interests of stability and regime preservation in Pyongyang. This 
view could be found when it ensured that a UN Security Council resolution in July 2010 
addressing the sinking of a South Korea naval vessel offered only a tepid condemnation, 
and failed to indict North Korea by name.189 Beijing argued that China will oppose any 
movement that causes conflict in the region and suggested diplomatic settlement by 
conversation after result of investigation of sinking. Therefore, even though the United 
States requested China takes a responsible role, China never dealt with this problem 
because its relationship with North Korea was major determinant for expanding and 
maintaining China’s leverage. 
2. Securing Stable Environment for Economic Growth 
As China’s strategic buffer zone, the DPRK is one essential determinant that 
allows China to concentrate upon economic development. In this context, instability on 
the Korean peninsula and the fallout of South Korea’s economic performance would 
damage China’s economic growth. Just as in the case of nuclear crisis, renewed 
confrontation would inevitably influence China’s economic development. As PRC policy 
is focused on its own essential interests, reducing the level of confrontation on the 
Korean Peninsula would be the course of action that China’s leaders would strive to 
achieve. This is why Beijing continues to assist Pyongyang economically and politically. 
The relevance between China’s top priority objectives, economic development, and 
controlling North Korea is as follows.  
First of all, instability caused by North Korea, such as nuclear crisis and low 
intensity conflict, has negative influence on security environment in Northeast Asia. 
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While all provocations by North Korea did not thoroughly bring about severely 
destabilized situations, the threat by North Korea not only increase geopolitical risk, but 
also could develop or explode into a large-scale international that no regional party would 
seek to have develop. Therefore, whenever North Korea gives rise to provocations, 
surrounding countries typically make an effort to prevent it from expanding into a 
regional crisis.  
Table 13.   Major Provocations by North Korea (1990–2010) 
 Major Events 
March, 1993 1st Nuclear Crisis 
November 17, 1998 2nd Crisis 
June 15, 1999 1st Naval Battle of West Sea 
June 15, 2002 2nd Naval Battle of West Sea 
October 16, 2002 2nd Nuclear Crisis 
November 10, 2009 3rd Navel Battle of West Sea 
May 25, 2009 3rd Nuclear Crisis 
March 26, 2010 Attacked South Korean naval vessel “Cheonan” 
November 23, 2010 Artillery attack toward South Korean Yeonpyung Island. 
 
In particular, such efforts deter Beijing from concentrating on developing its own 
priorities or objectives. Moreover, such provocation also serves as diplomatic burden for 
Beijing because, as the only country that may be able to exercise some measure of 
political control on North Korea, China has repeatedly been asked by the international 
community to prevent North Korea’s threat from escalating. For example, Hillary 
Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, requested Beijing prevent possible North Korean 
provocation during G-20 Summit in Seoul.190 Beijing, therefore, needs to maintain, a 
close relationship with North Korea to control and ameliorate North Korea’s indiscreet 
actions.  
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Secondly, economic cooperation with North Korea creates another dynamic that 
can improve China’s economic growth. Since 2002, China’s investment in North Korea 
has increased.191 
Table 14.   Chinese Investment in North Korea, 2003–2008 ($, Million)192 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
FDI 1.12 14.23 6.50 11.06 18.40 41.23 
 
China has invested in a wide variety of industries since 2002, especially 
underground resource and infrastructure.193 Seventy percent of total Chinese investments 
in North Korea are put into resource development there, and Chinese investment was 80 
percent of all resource development investment by foreign sources in North Korea.194 
According to the Hyundai Economy Institution, China invested 21.7 billion dollars in 
extraction of minerals in North Korea from 2004 to 2007. 195 Notwithstanding, China 
also has built infrastructure connecting North Korea and China since mid 2000s. Its 
purpose is to enhance economic connections with South Korea as well as the economic 
revitalization of the border region between China and North Korea. By spending roughly 
23.7 billion dollars to construct transportation infrastructure in a connected development 
strategy with North Korea, China not has a foothold to take its economic capability to the 
next level.  
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Table 15.   Present Condition of North Korea’s Infrastructure Plans by Chinese 
Investment ($, Million)196 
Region North Korea’s Infrastructure plans by Chinese Investment 
Development of 
Dandong-Sinuiju  
Building Dandong port industrial park and New Yalu River bridge 
Bidando economic specialized zone 
Development of 
Hunchun-Najin Hunchun-Nasun road, port, integration to  build sea channel 
Development of 
Jian-Manpo Building a new bridge near existing railroad of the Yalu river 
Developmetn of 
Mt Changbai  Building tourism complex 
 
An additional positive effect of investment is that China gradually can guide 
North Korea toward reforming its economic system. For Beijing, promoting economic 
stability in North Korea means stabilizing China’s periphery. Beijing also expects that 
building Chinese-led economy would bring China favorable economic environment. 
Investments and assistances toward North Korea would increase North Korea’s 
dependence on Chinese economy; that is, Chinese style capitalism and influx of 
consumer goods could have a potentially corrosive effect upon the level of control. It will 
allow China to take an advantageous position when China sets economic strategy 
regarding the Korean peninsula. Subordinate economic status of North Korea will be 
burden when South Korea assumes reunified country. Therefore, by expanding its 
economic relationship with North Korea, Beijing can take advantage of regional 
economic opportunities in pursuit of power and resources.  
Finally, China is always concerned with the potential for North Korea’s sudden 
collapse. Without peace on the periphery, Chinese stability and development cannot be 
guaranteed. Instability in North Korea, whether triggered by internal or external forces, 
would quickly destabilize the prosperity and development of China’s northeastern 
provinces, causing Beijing to face tensions and confusion. First of all, Beijing would 
suffer from flood of refugees from North Korea. Shen Dingli, director of the Center of 
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American Studies at Fudan University, writes, “The nightmare of Korean refugees 
pouring into China is not theoretical.” 197  In the mid-1990s when North Korea 
experienced a severe famine, tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of refugees flowed 
into China’s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region.198 In that case, China would have to 
use enormous economic resources to assure supplies of food and strengthen its border 
control. Not only that, depending on how China treated the refugees, Beijing would be 
evaluated as to whether it played a responsible role or not.199 Secondly, if armed conflict 
between North and South Korea occurs, it also could force China into risking conflict 
between the United States and the PRC, which would be catastrophically disruptive to 
PRC economic and social interests. Finally, even if the Korean peninsula reunifies 
peacefully, the PRC will be put in the situation of facing U.S. troops and a democratic 
U.S. allying countries directly on its border without the benefit of a buffer zone.  
Therefore, Beijing’s continuing economic assistance to and cooperation with 
North Korea could be part of securing China’s national interests. That’s because a more 
favorable security environment on the Korean peninsula would be more conducive to its 
own efforts to concentrate on China’s own four modernizations. Economic cooperation 
with North Korea in the name of traditional alliance assures China of a stable 
environment. So Beijing remits regularly to avoid paying the higher economic, political 
and national security cost of a North Korean collapse, war on the Peninsular, or the 
subsuming of the North into the South.  
C. CONCLUSION 
China’s 1961 security treaty with the DPRK was a product of the Cold War and 
Sino-Soviet rivalry. In view of today’s international politics, China should revise the 
Sino-DPRK treaty because the alliance was formed in preparation for the attacks of 
mutual foe. In the Korean War, North Korea and China viewed the United States as the 
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threat and formed the alliance to balance such a potential threat. In spite of the end of the 
Cold War and tremendous changes in the security environment, China still maintains a 
1961 treaty, and the treaty still provides Beijing with benefits that control and constrain 
North Korea’s military, as well as economic options. China does not seem too eager to 
change the status quo of the Korea peninsula. 
Actually, from China’s perspective, North Korea is a useful buffer zone that still 
contributes to their national security. Thus, China sees its military alliance with the 
DPRK as important, just as both Premier Zhou Enlai and People’s Liberation Army 
commander in chief Marshal Zhu De used the metaphor of neighbors “as close as lips to 
teeth” to delineate the strategic importance of Korea to China as a buffer state against 
hostile external powers.200 Therefore, China wants to adopt an objective and realistic role 
in the management of Korean issues and continues to support North Korea’s regime to 
expand China’s own influence. Beijing, indeed, has became a useful mediator between 
North and South Korea and served to de-escalate inter-Korean mistrust and tension. 
That’s a way to guarantee stable security environment in Northeast Asia in the pursuit of 
constant economic growth in China as well as gaining leverage as a mediator. 
Furthermore, Beijing believes that any changes in Korean peninsula could 
destabilize the delicate balance of power in Northeast Asia and complicate China’s 
regional strategic posture. Viewed from the perspective of China’s present policy 
priorities and steady economic growth, Korea’s peace and stability are important. China 
continues to use North Korea in order to enhance its leverage in the region and improve 
its capability. By doing so, China is able to formulate its own favorable security 
environment to achieve its national objective.  
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This thesis has addressed China’s perspective on North Korea’s strategic value 
according to transitions in international environment and China’s national interests. The 
PRC-DPRK alliance has lasted for more than a half century without revision. Numerous 
studies have predicted that the PRC-DPRK alliance does not serve as security alliance 
any more, due to the change of security threats. However, from a self-interest approach, 
Beijing still has a wide variety of reasons tomaintains its alliance with Pyongyang 
By analyzing changes in China’s external and internal security environment, this 
thesis finds that national interests play a significant role in maintaining the 1961 alliance 
treaty. The thesis was examined the national objective of China focusing on its political 
desire and economic development. A positive relationship with North Korea provides 
Beijing with considerable benefits.  
In the PRC-DPRK alliance, Beijing and Pyongyang has shared geopolitical 
interests to assure both countries’ survival. With Sino-Soviet split, the tense atmosphere 
of the Cold War, and common ideological identity, Beijing did not hesitate to cooperate 
with North Korea. Conversely, as long as enormous transition in world politics, such as 
Sino-Soviet reconciliation and the end of Cold War, as China participated in international 
society and Beijing decided to reform and open its economic system, it seemed that 
Beijing and Pyongyang have no shared security interests anymore. Beijing seemed to be 
reluctant to maintain the old style of friendship as long as Pyongyang continued to 
damage the PRC’s interests. As a result, their relations were seen as changing from “a 
blood-tied alliance” to “normal relations.”  
However, as China’s national objectives is stay focused on its future, North 
Korea’s strategic value have increased. Even though economic aid to North Korea is 
burden for China, and political support for North Korea places China in challenging 
circumstances, China seeks greater influence beyond simply a patron’s role; it is 
becoming an active participant in a wide variety of international diplomatic and economic 
institutions and takes an economic priority in the Korean peninsula. From China’s 
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strategic perspective, its traditional ties with North Korea are not worth maintaining, but 
North Korea still remains a good instrument to establish favorable environment for China 
to become the preeminent power and central provider of security in Northeast Asia. 
Notwithstanding some limitations posed by the absence of detailed analysis, this 
thesis has two important implications. First, the 1961 alliance treaty between the PRC 
and DPRK has been affected more by national interest than by traditional bonds. 
Although the PRC-DPRK alliance was created on the basis of “sealed in blood” relations, 
their relationship has changed according to what kind of interests China needed. Second, 
although the PRC-DPRK alliance looks like a unilateral alliance for ensuring North 
Korea’s regime survival, China gets significant collateral benefits by maintaining that 
alliance with North Korea. Therefore, when it comes to security issues on the Korea 
peninsula, China will continue to seek to act as the most important player to guarantee its 
interests.  
In brief, China will continue to support Pyongyang in order to control 
Pyongyang’s behavior. As long as North Korea has strategic value in Northeast Asia, 
China will emphasize its special relationship to promote its national interests and make 
best use of its historical position with North Korea.  
 
 71
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ahn, Yonghyun. The Secret History of Modern War 5. Seoul: Kyungin, 1992. 
An, inhae. “Present state and prospective of China’s policy toward North Korea.” Korea 
International Politics Institute. (December, 2006): 210–232. 
AtomicArchive.com. “Special Report: The Nuclear Crisis-North Korea.” 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/Northkorea/Timeline.shtml. Accessed 
November 5, 2010. 
Bajoria, Jayshree. “The China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations 
(July 2009). 
Http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html. 
Accessed October 1, 2010. 
Bergsten, C. Fred, Freeman, Charles, Lardy, Nicholas R., and Mitchell, Derek J. China’s 
Rise: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2008. 
Barnett, Michael and Levy, Jack. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The 
Case of Egypt.” International Organization 45, no.3 (Summer 1991): 369–395. 
Bernstein, Richard and Munro, Ross H. “China: The Coming Conflict with America.” 
Foreign Affairs 76, no.2 (March/April 1997): 18–33. 
Cho, Namhun. “The US-ROK alliance and North Korea’s Respond.” North Korea 
Economy Review (August 2010): 44-62. 
Cho, Yongjin. “China’s Alliance Policy toward North Korea in Post Cold War Era.” The 
Journal of International Relations (1995): 125–137. 
Choi, Jinook. North Korea 2008. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2008. 
“Delivering Concern regarding North Korea would be last.” Younhap News, November 2, 
2010. 
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/international/2010/11/02/0601080100AKR201011
02005900071.HTML. Accessed November 5, 2010. 
Deng Xiaoping.  Deng Xiaoping Quotes(鄧小平語錄). Beijing: Central Press, 1988. 
Dingli, Shen. “Cooperative Denuclearization Toward North Korea.” Washington 
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (October 2009): 175–189. 
 72
Dingli, Shen, “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China.” China Security (Autumn 
2006): 19–34. 
DPRK holds grand assembly to honor wartime Chinese volunteers.” Xinhua News, 
October 26. 2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-
10/26/c_13574892.htm. Accessed November 5, 2010. 
Fewsmith, Joseph. China since Tianmen: the Politic of Transition. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
Fingleton, Eamonn. In the Jaws of the Dragon: America’s fate in the coming era of 
Chinese Hegemony. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2008. 
Fitzgerald,CP. Chinese View of their Place in World. London: Oxford University Press, 
1965. 
Goldstein,Steven M. “Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations.” in 
Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, edited by Thomas W. Robinson 
and David Shambaugh: 224-265, New York: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Goncharov, Sergei, Lewis, John and Xue, Litai. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and 
Korean War. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
Holloway, David. “Gorbachev’s New Thinking, America and the World.” Foreign 
Affairs (1989): 66–81. 
Hughes, Barry B. Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives. 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1997. 
Huh, Moonyoung. “North Korea’s nuclear and peace of the Korean Peninsula.” Institute 
for Integration Research 18 (2005): 6–29. 
Huh, Moonyoung. Relationship between Russia and North Korea in the end of Cold War 
era. Seoul: institution for national unification, 1993. 
Hyundai Economy Institution. “Effects of Sino-North Korea Economic Cooperation.”  
Weekly Economic Review (October, 2009): 1–18. 
Jian, Chen. “Limits of the ‘lips and Teeth’ alliance: An historical Review of Chinese-
North Korean Relations.” Asia Program Special Report, no.115 (September 
2003): 4–10.  
Jian, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
Joo, Subil. Compromise between Bush and Kim Jongil. Seoul: Doori Media, 2007. 
 73
Jung, Yongsuk. “China’s recognition toward South Korea.” North Korea (April, 1984): 
76–83. 
Kang, Mangil. The National Revolutionary Party of Korea and the United Front. Seoul: 
Hwapyungsa, 1991. 
Kasuko, Mori. China and Soviet Union. Seoul: Saminseokak, 1989. 
Kim, Cheol. “Analysis on Economic Cooperation between China and North Korea.” KDI 
North Korea economy Review (March 2008): 50–66. 
Kim, Eunbee. “Study on Change of Sino-DPRK Alliance Cohesiveness after the Cold 
War.” (Master’s thesis, Yonsei University, 2007). 
Kim, Kyunghwan. “China announced it postion regarding Xi Jinping’s remark.” Voice of 
People, October 29, 2010.  http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000332035.html. Accessed 
November 13, 2010. 
Kim, Samuel S. “China and North Korea in a changing World.” Asia Program Special 
Report, no.115 (September 2003): 11–17. 
Kim, Samuel S. “China’s path to Great Power Status in the Globalization Era.” Asian 
Perspective 27, no.1 (Spring 2003): 35–75. 
Kim, Samuel S. “Making of China’s Korea policy,” in the Making of Chinese Foreign 
and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, edited by David M. Lampton: 371-408, 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
Kim, Samuel S. “The Changing Role of China on the Korean Peninsula.” International 
Journal of Korean Studies 8, no.1 (Fall/Winter 2004): 79–114. 
Kim, Seun. China’s foreign Policies and Korea, Seoul: Goryewon, 1999. 
Kim, Sungyung. “Kim Jongil said that Succession of friendship between the PRC and 
DPRK is my mission.” Joongang Ilbo, October 26, 2010. 
http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=4571804&cloc=rss%
7Cnews%7Cglobal. Accessed November 5, 2010. 
Kim, Sangsoon. History of North Korea. Seoul:JimoonKak, 1961. 
Kim, Yongho. “Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Allinace: Beijing’s Declining 
Credibility and Pyongyang’s Bandwagoning with Washington.” Issues & Studies 
37, no. 2 (March/April 2001): 147–176. 
Larson, Deborah Welch and Shevchenko, Alexei. “Status Seekers : Chinese and Russian 
responses to US primacy.” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 63–95. 
 74
Lee, Chaejin. China and Korea: Dynamic relations. California: Hoover Press Publication, 
1996. 
Lee, Dan. “Changes of DPRK-China Relationship and its Durability.” (Master’s thesis, 
Chonnam National University, 2003). 
Lee, Haejung. “Implication of Present Situation of Underground Resource Development 
in North Korea.” Hyundai Economic Institution (2009): 33–44. 
Lee, Kitaek. Theory of Modern International Politics. Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 1997. 
Lee, Kitaek. Modern International Politics. Seoul: Ilsinsa, 1986. 
Lee, Sangcheol “China-South Korea Summit in Beijing.” ChosunIlbo, September 28, 
1992. 
http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_service/pdf_ReadBody.jsp?Y=1992&M=09&D=
28&ID=9209280101. Accessed September 18, 2010. 
Lee, Sangkeun. “Changes in Chinese view toward the Unification of the Korean 
Peninsula.” (PhD Diss., Dankook University, 1995). 
Lee, Sangsook. “A study on the Change of North Korea-China’s Alliance.” (Master’s 
thesis, Dongguk University, 2001). 
Lee, Soo. “North Korea and Chinese Relation after Normalization of South Korea-China 
Relation.” (Master’s thesis, Sungkyunkwan University, 2008). 
Lee, Taehwan. The Korean Peninsula and Changes in Sino-the US Relationship. Seoul: 
Sejong institution, 2002. 
Lee, Taehwan. “Sino-ROK Strategic Partnership: Evaluation and Prediction.” Sejong 
Policy Research 6 (2010):123-138. 
Lewis, Nicole E. “Reassessing China’s role in North Korea.” Council on Foreign 
Relations (June 2010). 
Http://www.cfr.org/publication/22482/reassessing_chinas_role_in_north_korea.ht
ml. Accessed October 1, 2010. 
Levi,Werner. Modern China’s Foreign Policy. Minnesota Polis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1956. 
Lim, Deoksun. Geopolitics. Seoul: Buebmoonsa, 1999. 
Lin, Bih-Jaw and myers, James T. Contemporary China in the post cold War Era. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. 
 75
Liska, George. Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 
Liu, Guoli. Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition. New Jersey: New Brunswick, 2009. 
Marsh, Christopher and Dreyer, June Teufei. U.S.-China relations in the twenty-first 
Century: policies, Prospects and Possibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Book, 
2003. 
Marti, Michael E. China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping. Virginia: Brassey’s Inc. 2002. 
Mastanduno, Michael. “Hegemonic Order, September 11, and the Consequences of the 
Bush Revolution.” in the United States and Northeast Asia: Debate, Issues, and 
New Order, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Chungin Moon: 263-284. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefiled, 2008. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001. 
Meisner, Maurice. Mao’s China and After: a history of the People’s Republic. New York: 
the Free Press, 1999. 
Ministry of Unification. Monthly North Korea Trend. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 
2000. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New 
York: Knopf, 1972. 
Morrison, Wayne M. “China’s Economic Conditions.” Congress Research Service (CRS) 
Research for Congress. RL33534 (December 2009). 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf. Accessed October 8, 2010 
Morrow, James D. and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. “Sorting through the Wealth of 
Notions.” International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 56–73. 
Murray, Geoffrey. China: the Next Superpower: Dilemmas in Change and Continuity. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. 
Nakano, Tamotsu. “A Grand Design for Northeast Asia.” International Journal on World 
Peace 20, no. 3 (September 2003): 1–6.  
Nanto, Dick K., Manying, Mark E. and Dumbaugh, Kerry. “China-North Korea 
Relations.” Congress Research Service (CRS) Research for Congress. R41043 




Newminjoo.com. “Trade Volume with China increased by 22 times after Sino-South 
Korea Normalization.” 
http://newminjoo.com/sub_read.html?uid=3192&section=sc24. Accessed 
September 18, 2010. 
Nikitin, Mary Beth, Manyin, Mark E., Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Nanto, and Dick K. 
“North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1874.” Congress Research Service (CRS) Research for Congress. 
R40684 (April 2010): 1-23. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40684.pdf . Accessed  
November 8, 2010. 
Northeast Asian History Foundation. “Korea-China relations.” 
http://english.historyfoundation.or.kr/?sub_num=20. Accessed September 30, 
2010. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2009. Washington: US Department of Defense, 2009. 
Park, Changhee. “Geopolitical interest change and North Korea-China alliance 
relationship: Rising, Developing and viewing.” Research on China-Russia affairs 
113 (Spring, 2007): 27–55. 
Park, Changhee. “Relationship between China and Russia and Geopolitical changes in 
Eurasia.” National Strategy 12 (2006): 73–102.  
Park, Kicheol. “Neo-realistic Approach toward the PRC foreign Policy.” (Ph.D. diss., 
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 1995). 
Park, Kyungha. “Changes in Sino-North Korean Alliance and the North Korean Nuclear 
Crisis.” (Master’s Theis, Yonsei University, 2008). 
Park, Taeho. The History of Foreign Relations of the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Korea. Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1985. 
Patrick, Stewart. “Irresponsible Stakeholders.” Foreign Affairs (November / December 
2010). 
Person, James Limits of the “lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK 
Relations, 1955–1984. Washington: Woodro Wilson International center for 
Scholars, 2009. 
Ross, Robert S. “Beijing as a Conservative Power.” Foreign Affair 76, no.2 (March/April 
1997): 33–45. 
Ross, Robert S. and Feng, Zhu. China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of 
International Politics. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008. 
 77
Savagem, Tomothy L. “China’s Policy toward North Korea.” International Journal on 
World Peace 20 (September 2003): 29–35. 
Schweller, Randall L. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in.” 
International Security 19 (Summer 1994): 72–107. 
Scobell, Andrew. China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s 
Length. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.  
Scobell, Andrew. “China and North Korea: the Limits of Influence.” Current History 102, 
no. 665 (September 2003): 274–284. 
Scobell, Andrew. “China and North Korea: The Close but Uncomfortable Relationship.” 
Current History 101 (September 2002): 278–283. 
Seo, Bomi. “Emerging Countries will lead Global Economy.” Korean Economy Daily, 
November 3, 2010. 
http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2010110350731. 
Accessed November 8, 2010. 
Seo, Jinyoung, Policy Prospect and interests of four countries around the Korean 
Peninsula. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1992. 
Shambaugh, David. “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the long term.” The 
Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 43–56. 
Shimko, Keith L. International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies. Boston: 
Wardsworth, 2010. 
Shin, Jongho. “Policy Brief: 2010 Prediction of China’s Condition and Sino-Korea 
Relationship.” Gyeonggi Research Institute (January, 2010): 1–14. 
Shin, Jungrok et al., “Neo China-Pax Americana: Economic Comparison between China 
and the US.” Chosun Ilbo, October 1,   2009. 
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/10/01/2009100100077.html?Dep
0=chosunnews&Dep1=related&Dep2=related_all. Accessed October 11, 2010. 
Shiying, Pan. Reflections on Modern Strategy: Post Cold War Strategic Theory. Beijing: 
Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe(世界知识出版), 1993. 
Sigal, Leon V. United State did not intend to Cooperate. Seoul: Social Critics, 1999. 
Snyder, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. New York: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
Snyder, Scott. “China-Korea Relations: China Embraces South and North, but 
Differently.” A quarterly E-journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations. (January 
2010): 1–9. 
 78
Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton & Company, Inc, 
1990. 
Spurr, Russel. Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea, 
1950-1951. New York: Newmarket Press, 1988. 
Swaine, Michael D. China Domestic Change and Foreign Policy. Santa Monica, Calif.: 
National Defense Research Institute, 1995. 
Swaine, Michael D. and Tellis, Ashley J. Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, 
Present, and Future. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2000. 
The Chinese Academic of Social Science(中國社會科學園). Modern Chinese Military 
Operation Part 1(唐代中國軍工作 1). Beijing: The Chinese Academic of Social 
Science(中國社會科學園), 1989. 
Thompson, Drew. “Border Burdens: China’s Response to the Myanmar Refugee Crisis.” 
China Security, no.3 (2009): 11–22. 
To, Lee Lai. “East Asian Assessments of China’s Security Policy.” International affairs 
73 (Summer 1997): 251–262. 
Vang, Pobzeb. Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies. Indiana: Author House, 2008. 
Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance: Balancing and Bandwagoning.” in International Politics: 
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, edited by Robert J. Art and Robert 
Jervis: 108-115. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2002). 
Walt, Stephan M. the Origin of Alliance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987. 
Walt, Stephen M. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse.” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 
156–179. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International 
Security 9, no. 4 (July, 1985): 3–43. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
White, Stephen, Gardner, John, and Schopflin, George. Communists and Communist 
Political System: An Introduction. Hamshire: Macmillan, 1982. 




Xuequan, Mu. “China commemorates 60th anniversary of participation in Korean War.” 
Xinhua News, October 26, 2010. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/26/c_13574898.htm. 
Accessed November 11, 2010. 
Zhou, Scott. “All teeth and lips for now.” Asian Times Online, October 26, 2006. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HJ21Ad01.html. Accessed September 30, 
2010. 
Zhao, Suisheng. Chinses Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 
 
 80
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 81
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST  
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Korea National Defense University Library 
Korea National Defense University 
Seoul, Republic of Korea 
